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A Balance of Interests: The Concordance
of Copyright Law and Moral Rights in
the Worldwide Economy
Michael B. Gunlicks*
INTRODUCTION
Modern copyright law is facing an unprecedented challenge.
The combined and interrelated forces of technological progress and
globalization have created a communications revolution whose end
and ultimate direction are impossible to predict. These forces will
require national governments to work ever closer to ensure that the
rights of authors, publishers, and the public are adequately
protected and that the incentive to create and distribute works of
authorship is not harmed by unauthorized reproduction and use of
these works.1
The United States has recognized this challenge. Over the past
30 years, it has worked aggressively to bring its laws into greater
conformity with those of other nations in order to secure for
American authors the highest level of international protection.2
Unfortunately, the path to greater international cooperation in
the future is blocked by a philosophical divide between the United
States and continental Europe.3 The United States is the most
*

Associate, Spotts Fain Chappell & Anderson, P.C. The College of William &
Mary, B.A., 1990; George Washington University Law School, J.D. 1995; The Europa
Institut, University of the Saarland, LL.M. 1998. The author wishes to thank Spotts Fain
Chappell & Anderson, P.C., the law library of the University of Richmond, and the
faculty of the Europa Institut for their support in the preparation of this article.
1
See Copyright Treaty, Geneva, Dec. 20, 1996, preamble, 36 I.L.M. 65, 68 (1997)
(“Recognizing the need to introduce new international rules and clarify the interpretation
of certain existing rules in order to provide adequate solutions to the questions raised by
new economic, social, cultural and technological developments.”).
2
See 3 MELVILLE B. & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.01 (1998)
(stating that the motivation behind increased protections for foreign works was to benefit
American authors by keeping U.S. law in line with the laws of its “principle trading
partners”). The United States has progressively adjusted its law over the past 30 years to
increase protections for foreign authors in America in the hope and expectation that this
would lead to greater protection for American works abroad. Id. In furtherance of this
aim the U.S. has acceded to the Geneva Copyright Treaty. Id.
3
See Stig Strömholm, Copyright: National and International Development, in 14
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 2, 3-22 (1990) [hereinafter
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significant adherent of the “Common Law” system of copyright
protection derived from the common law and copyright statutes of
the United Kingdom.4 The other major branch of copyright law is
the “Continental” system of copyright protection, which evolved
primarily in France and Germany.5 Most other nations in the
world have systems similar to those of America, France, or
Germany.6 Despite increasing harmony between these systems,
the American and Continental approaches to copyright law still
lack the requisite consensus to guarantee effective and certain
global protection of copyrightable works in the twenty-first
century.
The central cause of the disagreement between the Common
Law and Continental systems revolves around the question of why
copyright law exists. The French and German position is that the
purpose of copyright law is to safeguard the author’s interests.7
The United States maintains that the reason for copyright law is to
serve the public interest.8
In its essence, however, this distinction between public and
private interests is esoteric. The United States Constitution
provides that Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . .”9
(hereinafter “Copyright Clause.”).
Thus, the primary
constitutional purpose for the copyright power is the public
interest.10
But the Constitution also grants the author a
“Strömholm I”].
4
Also known as the “Anglo-American” system. See id. Most Common Law
systems in the world are based on British law. Id. See, e.g., Brad Sherman, From the
Non-original to the Ab-original, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 128 (Brad Sherman &
Alain Strowel eds., 1994) (using the term “Anglo-Australian”).
5
Also known as the “civil law,” or the “Romano-Germanic” system. Other civil
law systems tend to follow the French and German models. See Strömholm I, supra note
3, at 3-22. Although different in many ways, the French and German approaches to
copyright law are very similar, especially when compared to the Common Law
perspective. Stig Strömholm, Copyright: Comparison of Laws, in XIV INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 3, 3-95 (1990) [hereinafter “Strömholm II”].
6
See Strömholm I, supra note 3, at 3-22.
7
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in
Revolutionary France and America, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra note 4, at 13132.
8
See id.
9
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
10
Id. (“To promote the progress of Science and useful Arts . . . ”). See Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985) (“copyright is intended
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fundamental, exclusive right to control his work.11 Consequently,
the Copyright Clause serves a dual purpose: to protect the interest
of the public and protect the interests of authors.
Thus, the goal of copyright law is to protect the public interest
by protecting the author’s interests. As stated by James Madison,
the framer of the Constitution’s Copyright Clause, “the public
good fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.”12 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that the
primary purpose of copyright law is to protect the rights of the
individual author in order to safeguard the motivation to create
works of authorship.13 The only Constitutional limitation on the
author’s right is that it be limited in time.
American, French and German law are in agreement that
copyright law should protect the author’s interests. Accordingly,
all three systems have similar provisions regarding the basic rights
of authors,14 and all recognize that the authors’ interests must be
balanced with those of the public to ensure the greatest economic
and social benefit.
to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge”); Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (“The objective is to promote the progress of science and the arts”);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the
[Copyright Clause] is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare.”).
11
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (“by securing . . . to Authors . . . the exclusive right . . . .”).
This is the only individual fundamental right contained in the original text of the
Constitution.
12
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
13
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546 (the Copyright Act “‘is intended to motivate
the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward’”
(quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984))).
See also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The
immediate effect of [U.S.] copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’
creative labor.”); Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559, 565 (the “very objective” of the copyright is
“to induce new artistic creations”: the copyright statutes are meant to insure that authors
receive “adequate protection to encourage further artistic and creative effort.”); American
Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1907) (the “copyright is an
exclusive right . . . for the benefit of the author or his assigns” and the Copyright Act
“must be read in the light of the intention of Congress to protect this intangible right as a
reward of the inventive genius that has produced the work”); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S.
82, 86 (1898) (copyright is “[t]he right of an author to control the publication of his
works”); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1883) (it should not
“be supposed that the framers of the Constitution did not understand the nature of
copyright and the objects to which it was commonly applied, for copyright, as the
exclusive right of a man to the production of his own genius or intellect” was a
recognized right at the time).
14
See Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 3-53, 71-96.
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Despite the Euro-American consensus on the importance of
authors’ rights, one glaring exception to the general harmony
between American and Continental copyright law remains. This
exception concerns the recognition of an author’s moral rights.
The French and German systems regard moral rights as the heart
and soul of copyright law. To the Europeans, moral rights
symbolize the author-oriented nature of their copyright systems.
Theoretically, under the European system, the very basis of
copyright law is an author’s moral right.15
American copyright law, on the other hand, recognizes no moral
rights per se.16 Rather, the notion of “moral rights” is generally
unsettling to the average American lawyer.17 Americans tend to
fear moral rights because of the broad, subjective and undefined
nature of the word “moral,”18 and the fear that recognition of these
rights might unreasonably tip the balance of interests between
authors and the public in favor of the authors.19 The concern is
that this tipping of the scales might lead to hypersensitive authors
making unreasonable demands upon publishers, thereby preventing
15

See ADOLF DIETZ, DAS DROIT MORAL DES
UND DEUTSCHEN URHEBERRECHT 38-39 (1968).

URHEBERS

IM

NEUEN FRANZÖSISCHEN

“Moral rights” can also be defined as “personal rights,” i.e., the
author’s interests in his work. The general term “moral right” can be
equated to the term “natural right.” Originally, copyright was also
considered a natural right in the common law, before courts
considered the natural right to be superseded by statute.
Id.

16
See Gilliam v. American Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American
copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of
action for their violation.”). See also Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Vargas
v. Esquire, 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
17
See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 136 (1994)
(“unfortunately named moral rights”); Granz, 198 F.2d at 590 (Frank, J., concurring) (it
smacks of “something not legal, something meta-legal”).
18
“Moral” pertains to character, conscience and “general principles of right conduct”
instead of positive law. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1008 (6th ed. 1990). There is a fear
that “wherever the judicial power is allowed to encroach too far on the widely extended
domain of moral duties, it is in danger of becoming inconsistent and unjust.” Prince
Albert v. Strange, 64 Eng. Rep. 293, 309 (V.Ch. 1849). The failure to maintain the
distinction between morality and law would open the door “to the most injurious and
arbitrary invasions of the rights of individuals by the ruling power.” Id.
19
See WILLIAM R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE
MARK AND ALLIED RIGHTS 310 (1989) (Common law representatives have long feared
that the recognition of moral rights would cause publishers, employers and the public to
be “held to ransom as infringers of moral rights at a time when it would be difficult and
expensive to rectify the wrong. It was this overbearing potential in foreign laws which
had for long fuelled the common law antagonism towards them.”).
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the publication of socially beneficial material.
This American fear, however, is not justified given the practical
application of moral rights in the Continental systems. In France
and Germany, moral rights are clearly defined and limited. They
protect concrete rights of the author — they are not a broad
amorphous right of action for him to claim whenever his ego feels
slighted. In the practical sense, moral rights protect an author
against an unreasonable use of his work. American law has long
recognized the need to prevent unreasonable exploitation by
invoking an unwritten unfair use doctrine to prevent uses of a work
that would stymie an author’s creative drive.20
Accordingly, moral rights do not contradict the public interest
and are compatible with American law. Moreover, by acceding to
the Berne Convention (hereinafter “Berne”) in 1988, the United
States legally obligated itself to enforce the moral rights of
authors.21 Berne provides “the highest internationally recognized
standards” for copyright protection.”22 By acceding to Berne, the
United States agreed to enforce moral rights in American courts.
In spite of this legal obligation to guarantee a minimum of moral
rights protection, to this day the United States refuses to officially
recognize moral rights, and the enforcement of those rights in
American courts remains questionable.23
As the pace of globalization increases, moral rights loom on the
horizon as a divisive issue. The majority of countries in the world
recognize moral rights.24 The American misperception of moral
rights and refusal to effectively implement them — despite a
legally binding obligation to do so — continues to be a significant
barrier to further international agreement on the basic protections
of copyright law and continues to hinder the expansion of
copyright protection throughout the globe. Prior to 1988, the
absence of the United States from Berne caused other governments

20

See infra notes 36-306 and accompanying text.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Sept. 9, 1886,
revised in 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, 1971), 25 U.S.T. 1341 [hereinafter “Berne”].
22
See Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late Than Never: Implementation Of The 1886 Berne
Convention, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 171 (1989) (quoting Remarks of President Ronald
Reagan on Signing the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1405 (Oct. 31, 1988)).
23
See infra notes 358-81 and accompanying text.
24
See, e.g., Strömholm I, supra note 3, at 26.
21
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to resist American efforts to increase international protection.25
The United States’ accession to Berne was motivated in part by an
American desire to enhance its “political credibility” and improve
its bargaining position internationally.26 By not adhering to Berne
in full, and by ignoring rights recognized in most other nations, the
United States continues to leave the door open for other nations to
refuse American initiatives to improve international protection for
American authors.
Ultimately, moral rights could prove to be an effective means of
combating future threats to the rights of American authors.27
Effective moral rights protections in the United States and abroad
will serve to protect American works of authorship from
challenges caused by technological innovation that do not fall
within the traditional scope of copyright law.
The United States must reconsider and change its stance on
moral rights. It has made great efforts to change from a system
that largely ignored the rights of foreigners, to one that grants them
broad rights.28 Moral rights are the last significant — but most
symbolic — gap between the basic rights offered to authors by
American law and the rights enjoyed by authors in most other
countries. In short, it is in the United States’ interest to close this
gap in order to “secure the highest available level” of protection
for American authors in the global marketplace.29
This article will demonstrate that moral rights are entirely
compatible with the Anglo-American approach to copyright law
and that it is in the public interest of the United States to
implement effective moral rights protections in conformity with
the Berne Convention. Part I will discuss the basic moral rights
recognized by Continental law and the United States’ obligation to
25

See Hatch, supra note 22, at 178 (“[T]he conspicuous absence of the United States
amongst the Convention’s signatory states provided some foreign states with an excuse to
avoid stronger bilateral protections.”).
26
See id. at 179.
27
See infra notes 399-406 and accompanying text.
28
See Hatch, supra note 22, at 172-81. As stated by Secretary of Commerce C.
William Verity during the hearings on joining Berne: “Nobody could match us in our
disdain for the rights of foreign authors.” Id. at 173.
29
See id. at 171 (The motivation behind joining Berne was to “secure the highest
available level of international copyright protection of U.S. artists, authors, and copyright
holders.”) (quoting Remarks of President Ronald Reagan on Signing the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1405 (Oct. 31,
1988)).
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protect these rights under international law. Part II will discuss the
longstanding and nearly absolute protection of the moral right to
publish under American common and statutory law, and will
demonstrate that there is little variation between American, French,
and German protections for the author’s right to control the
publication of his work. Part III will briefly discuss the
international safeguards for the moral rights of attribution and
integrity, and will demonstrate that American law applies an unfair
use doctrine that prevents the unreasonable substitution or
omission of an author’s name and the unreasonable distortion or
alteration of his work, regardless of the traditional view that United
States law does not recognize moral rights. Parts IV, V, VI, and
VII examine the protections offered by American and Continental
law to the rights of attribution, integrity, and retraction, and
demonstrate that these rights enjoy significant protection under
United States law that does not differ substantially in practical
application from the protection of those rights under Continental
law. Part VIII demonstrates the inherent harmony between United
States law and moral rights. Part IX demonstrates that it is clearly
in the United States’ interest to implement moral rights based on
the considerations that (i) the United States is in breach of its legal
obligations under the Berne Convention; (ii) the United States
could implement moral rights with little or no disruption to either
the current copyright system or the economic exploitation of the
work; (iii) American authors deserve equal protection under United
States law; (iv) the modern challenges to copyright law and
authors’ rights are unprecedented; and (v) that those challenges can
only be met on the international level, which is only possible if the
major copyright producing and consuming nations agree on the
most fundamental rights of an author in his works.
I. MORAL RIGHTS IN GENERAL

A. Introduction
Modern moral rights are the result of transnational legal
developments in Europe throughout the past century.30 Moral
30
See 1 STIG STRÖMHOLM, LE DROIT MORAL DE L’AUTEUR
FRANÇAIS ET SCANDINAVE (1966) [hereinafter “Strömholm III”].

EN

DROIT ALLEMAND,
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rights protect the product of an author’s genius and labor from
harmful intrusions by publishers, i.e., those who make the author’s
work-product public. Moral rights gained widespread international
acceptance during the 1920’s to the extent that sufficient support
existed to add them to the minimum rights of Berne at the Rome
revision conference in 1928.31
B. Moral Rights Under the Berne Convention
France and Germany are the birthplace of moral rights. French
and German law recognize four basic moral rights: (i) The right to
publish — the right to decide whether, when, how and by whom
the work will be made public; (ii) the right of attribution — the
right to receive credit for a published work in the fashion that the
author wishes; (iii) the right of integrity — the right to prevent or
be compensated for any actions that mutilate, damage, or
materially alter the substance of the author’s original work and that
do harm to the author’s honor or reputation; and, (iv) the right to
retract — the right to prevent a public dissemination of the work
prior to or after publication, provided the author meets certain
conditions.32
Berne explicitly protects only two of the four moral rights
recognized by French and German law: the right of attribution and
the right of integrity.
Insufficient international agreement
prevented the inclusion of the right to publish and the right to
retract among Berne’s moral rights.33
C. The United States’ Obligations and Interest in Protecting
Moral Rights
As a party to Berne, the United States must comply with the
minimum rights of the treaty. Among these minimum rights are
the rights of attribution and integrity, and thus American law must

31

See id.
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 32. The “right to modify” is considered a moral right
by some, but generally is not included among the moral rights. “With few exceptions . . .
legislatures and courts have . . . refused to admit a [right to modify] as claimed by some
copyright lawyers.” Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 65.
33
See Strömholm III, supra note 30, at 382-403.
32
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enforce them.34
Considering the American interest in achieving greater harmony
in international copyright law, an appraisal of American
protections for all four moral rights recognized by Continental law
is useful in determining the compatibility of moral rights to
American law.35 For example, although it does not recognize them
as “moral” rights, American copyright law already explicitly
protects the right to publish and the right to retract.
II. THE RIGHT TO PUBLISH
An author has complete control over his work until he decides to
publish it. This right to publish is one of the fundamental tenets of
Common Law copyright law and the oldest recognized moral right.
It is the gateway right for copyright protection as well as moral
rights protection.
A. United States Law

1. Common Law
British common law first protected the right to publish in 1732.36
The American common law right to publish flowed directly from
this precedent. As stated by Justice Story, “the adjudications of the
Courts of the United States and of England are in entire harmony
upon this branch of the law.”37
In Wheaton v. Peters, the Supreme Court held “[t]hat an author,
at common law, has a property in his manuscript . . . cannot be
doubted.”38 Under the common law right to publish, “the property
of the author . . . in his intellectual creation [was] absolute until he
34

But the U.S. can deny these rights to American authors because the country of
origin retains the right to apply domestic law to its citizens and residents. See Berne,
supra note 21, at art. 5(2).
35
Much of the resistance to moral rights at the time was based on the belief that the
United States would be required to adopt rights identical to those in France. Hatch, supra
note 22, at 181, 185-86.
36
See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
37
2 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 943 (11th ed. 1873).
38
33 U.S. 591, 656 (1834).
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voluntarily part[ed] with the same.”39 The author could only
relinquish this right by contract or some unequivocal act that
indicated his intent to part with his right to publish.40 Otherwise,
the author had the absolute right to determine whether, “when,
where, by whom, and in what form” the work would be
published.41 In short, under American common law “the author
[had] a property” in his expression and “the copyright thereof
exclusively belong[ed] to him.”42 No law could “compel an author
to publish” and “[n]o one [could] determine this essential matter of
publication but the author.”43
This common law right was recognized by federal and state
courts and was applied generously. Courts enforced the right
specifically for literature,44 plays,45 and letters.46 In general, it
applied to “‘[e]very new and innocent product of mental labor . . .
embodied in writing, or some other material form.”47 Thus, as
long as the expression could be discerned from the material form,
the right to publish would be protected. It was enforceable against
innocent third parties;48 it was perpetual and enforceable by
heirs;49 and, unlike statutory copyright, it applied to foreigners as

39

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (quoting American Tobacco, 207 U.S. at 299).
See Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 543 (1872). An unconditional sale of a
painting with no reservation of copyright would constitute a transfer of the right to
publish; Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., 39 N.E.2d 249, 251 (1942). A “de facto
publication or performance or dissemination may tip the balance of equities” against the
author; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (emphasis added).
41
See Palmer, 47 N.Y. at 536.
42
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
43
Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 Fed. Cas. 967, 968 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 1,076).
44
See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Feldman, 89 N.E.2d 863 (1949); Rees v. Peltzer, 75 Ill.
475 (Cir. Ct. 1874).
45
See, e.g., Palmer, 47 N.Y. at 543; Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (1882).
46
See, e.g., Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at 346 (addressees of letters do have the right to
publish them “upon such occasions, as require, or justify, the publication or public use of
them; but this right is strictly limited to such occasions.” This exception might, for
example, have been invoked by the Clinton Administration to justify the release of
private letters from Kathleen Willey); Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297 (Orleans 1811);
Grigsby v. Breckenridge, 2 Bush (Ky.) 480 (Ky. App. 1867).
47
Palmer, 47 N.Y. at 537.
48
See Chamberlain, 89 N.E.2d at 863 (holding that Mark Twain’s heirs could
prevent publication of an unpublished short story by a third party who had no knowledge
of any restriction on the work). See also Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at 346 (“A fortiori, third
persons, standing in no privity with either party, are not entitled to publish” an
unpublished work.).
49
See Chamberlain, 89 N.E.2d at 863.
40
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well as citizens.50
2. Statutory Law
Since the passage of the first copyright act in 1790, the right to
publish has enjoyed indirect or direct protection under the
copyright statutes.51 As early as 1841, in Folsom v. Marsh, Justice
Story concluded that the laws of 1790 and 1831 gave “by
implication to the author, or legal proprietor of any manuscript
whatever, the sole right to print and publish the same . . . .”52
Arguably, they gave the author this right explicitly.53 The
Copyright Act of 1870 also provided that violators were liable for
damages, and that courts had equitable power to prevent
unauthorized publication.54 In contrast to its predecessors, the
Copyright Act of 1909 provided no direct protection, but stipulated
that nothing in the Act interfered with the common law right to
publish.55
In 1976 the right to publish was incorporated explicitly into the
subject matter of the new Copyright Act in order to conform
American law to Berne.56 As a result, the Copyright Act now
50

See Palmer, 47 N.Y. 532, 538 (1872) (“That which is regarded and protected as
property by the law of the owner’s domicile, as well as by the laws of this State, must be
equally within the protection of the law, whether the owner be a citizen or alien.”) (citing
JOSEPH STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 376, 379, 380 (7th ed. 1872).
51
The Copyright Acts of 1790 and 1831 both had sections providing that any person
printing or publishing a manuscript without the consent of the author or the assignee
“shall be liable” for all damages caused by such a publication. Copyright Act of 1790,
ch. 15, § 6, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (1790); Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 9, 4 Stat. 436, 438
(1831). Moreover, the Act of 1831 provided that the federal courts “empowered to grant
injunctions to prevent the violation of the rights of authors” were also empowered
“according to the principles of equity, to restrain” any non-consensual publication of a
manuscript. Ch. 16, § 9, 4 Stat. at 438.
52
9 Fed. Cas. at 347.
53
The provisions that violators “shall be liable,” and that federal courts have the
same powers to enforce the right to publish as they do the copyright, speak in favor of
such an interpretation. No mention is made of the right to publish as a separate common
law right in the Copyright Acts of 1790 and 1831.
54
See VII ROYAL CROWN CASES 134 (Robert Campbell ed., 1901).
55
See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 2, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909) (“Nothing in
this Act shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an
unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or
use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefore.”).
56
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1997) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
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protects a work entirely from the moment of its creation.57 An
involuntary transfer of an unpublished work can occur only after a
voluntary declaration of bankruptcy.58 And the right to publish is
protected regardless of the nationality of the author.59 Moreover,
the traditional right to publish was strengthened by the Copyright
Act’s requirement that a voluntary transfer of copyright be made in
writing.60 However, the Copyright Act’s inclusion of the right to
publish did place one significant limitation on the traditional right
— while the common law right to publish was perpetual, the
statutory right is limited to seventy years after the death of the
author.61
Thus, in general, the inclusion of the right to publish into the
Copyright Act has not significantly affected the extent of
protection that was afforded under the common law. The main
distinction is that the “fair use” exception did not specifically apply
to the right to publish before its incorporation into the Act,62
although similar considerations could “tip the balance of equities
in favor of a prepublication use.”63
But even though fair use now applies to the right to publish, “it
has never been seriously disputed that ‘the fact that the [author’s]
work is unpublished . . . is a factor tending to negate the defense of
fair use.’”64 Thus, in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises
(hereinafter “Harper & Row”), the Supreme Court held that the use
of excerpts from an unpublished work infringed the author’s right
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). See also id. § 101 (“A work is
created when it is fixed . . . for the first time.”). Every version of a work is protected, no
matter how incomplete, as long as it is able to be perceived.
57
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 544. “Creation” means fixation in a “copy” for the
first time: a “copy” is a material object from which the expression can be communicated.
A work does not have to be finished for creation to occur: every fixed portion of the work
constitutes the work at that time. And every version “constitutes a separate work.” 17
U.S.C. § 101. Unlike under the Copyright Act of 1909, formalities such as registration
are no longer required to pursue a claim for infringement. Id. § 408(a).
58
See id. § 201(e).
59
See 17 U.S.C. § 104.
60
See id. § 204(a). Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976 the common law right to
publish could be transferred orally.
61
See id. §§ 302, 303. Thus, the Berne Convention had a limiting effect in this area
of American copyright law.
62
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550-51. See also infra note 74.
63
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551. See also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
64
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551. The Court’s use of the word “tending”
demonstrates that it did not hold that unauthorized publication automatically negates fair
use. See also infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
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to publish despite the strong public interest in obtaining the
information.65 Although the Court indicated that it might have
found for the author regardless, based on the importance of the
material taken from the work,66 the Court emphasized the special
nature of the right to publish, stating that: “Under ordinary
circumstances, the author’s right to control the first public
appearance of his . . . expression will outweigh a claim of fair
use.”67 The Court thereby recognized the author’s interests in
creative control.68 Under the Court’s rationale, copyright and the
right to publish are not to be weighed equally: “Because the
potential damage to the author . . . is substantial, the balance of
equities in evaluating . . . fair use inevitably shifts.”69 The right to
publish “encompasses not only the choice whether to publish at all,
but also the choices of when, where, and in what form first to
publish a work.”70
In Salinger v. Random House (hereinafter “Salinger”), the
Second Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Harper
& Row by placing special emphasis on the fact that letters cited
without permission in a biography of J.D. Salinger were
unpublished.71 The court went on to hold that both direct quotes
and close paraphrases of Salinger’s expressions violated his right
to publish.72 Furthermore, the court stated that Harper & Row
“conveys the idea that [unpublished] works normally enjoy
complete protection against copying any protected expression.”73
In 1992 Congress amended the fair use provision of the
Copyright Act — “[t]he fact that a work is unpublished shall not
itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon

65

See 471 U.S. at 556 (“substantial public import”).
See id. at 569.
67
Id. at 555. This “right to control” weighs against uses that might be allowed under
post-publication copyright, such as use in a review or news account. Id. at 564.
68
See id. at 554-55. See also id. at 564 (“A use that so clearly infringes the copyright
holder’s interests in confidentiality and creative control is difficult to categorize as
‘fair.’”).
69
Id. at 553. See also id. at 552-55. The legislative materials also supported this
conclusion. Id.
70
Id. at 564.
71
See 811 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1987). The fact that the biography was unauthorized
did not help.
72
See id. at 97-98. The paraphrases were used with the intent to copy Salinger’s
manner of expression.
73
Id. at 97.
66
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consideration of all [four of the fair use factors].”74 Though the
intent of this amendment was to limit the broad scope of the right
to publish, its effect will likely be limited. In essence, the
amendment changes nothing with regard to the fair use
determination for unpublished works. Neither the Supreme Court,
nor the Second Circuit, based its decision solely on the fact that the
works were unpublished.75 Both courts applied the entire fair use
test; thus, other factors weighed heavily in their decisions.76 The
unpublished nature of the works weighed heavily in the author’s
favor, but it was not determinative: it was simply an element to be
considered in applying the fair use test.77 Congress’ amendment
changes neither the importance of the right to publish to the author,
nor the fact that the equities involved in a fair use determination
differ for the right to publish and the post-publication copyright.78
B. Continental Law
Article 19 of the French copyright law grants the author the sole
right to publish his work.79 This right ensures the French author’s
liberty to control the manner and conditions of publication and to
avoid any non-consensual publication.80 Therefore, the right to
publish is dependent on the author’s consent,81 which must be
express or at least able to be implied from the circumstances.82
Under French law, authors maintain a host of rights. For
example, creditors are prohibited from seizing an unpublished

74

Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997)). The
factors in § 107 to be considered in finding fair use are: 1) the purpose and character of
the use; 2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used; and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. Id.
75
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (1985) (“tending to negate the defense of fair
use”); Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97 (2d Cir. 1987) (“normally enjoy complete protection”).
76
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-69; Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96-98.
77
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (“The fact that a work is unpublished is a
critical element in its ‘nature,’” the second fair use factor.).
78
See supra notes 37-43, 62-77 and accompanying text.
79
Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 19. (“The
author has the sole right to make his work public.” [L’auteur a seul le droit de divulguer
sont oeuvre.]).
80
See ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT 495, n. 52 (1993).
81
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 60. Cf. supra note 39 and accompanying text.
82
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 60. Cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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work without the author’s consent,83 and public lectures do not in
and of themselves constitute publication.84 The author also has a
strong interest in protecting his right to review and correct his
work.85 An abandonment of a work does not permit a third party
to publish it.86
Unlike its American cousin, French copyright law allows an
author to refuse to deliver his work to a purchaser despite
contractual obligations, though the author will be liable for
restitution and damages.87 Furthermore, the moment of delivery is
not determined by actual delivery of the work, but by the author’s
decision that the work is completed.88
In Germany, Article 12 of the copyright law protects the right to
publish.89 Article 6 of the German law reinforces the notion that a
publication can occur only with the author’s consent.90 The
provision that an author can determine “how” his work will be
83

See Vergne v. Créanciers Vergne, Cour royale de Bordeaux, S. Jur. 1828-30, 2, 5.
Cf. supra note 58 and accompanying text.
84
See Marle v. Lacordaire, Cour royale de Lyon, July 17, 1845, D. 1845, 2, 128; S.
1845, 2, 469. Cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text.
85
See Lacordaire, D. 1845, 2, 128; S. 1845, 2, 469. Cf. supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
86
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 59, citing Camoin, Trib. civ., Seine, Nov. 15, 1927, D.
1928, 2, 89; Paris, Mar. 6, 1931, D. 1931, 2, 88. Cf. supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
87
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 58, citing Whistler, Trib. civ., Seine, Mar. 20, 1895 &
Paris, Dec. 2, 1897, D. 1898, 2, 565; Cass. civ., Mar. 14, 1900, D. 1900, 1, 497 (holding
that artist who contracted to paint a portrait could withhold the portrait from the
purchaser). The same result could possibly occur in an American court, but under a
theory of contract law instead of copyright. Considering the personal nature of an
unpublished work, a court might be inclined to award damages instead of specific
performance.
88
See Vollard v. Rouault, Trib. civ., Seine, Sept. 10, 1946, D. 1947, 98; Cour
d’Appel Paris, Mar. 19, 1947, D. 1949, 20. See also P. v. Consorts Rouault, Cour
d’Appel Orléans, Mar. 17, 1965, J.C.P. 1965, 14186. Such a result would be unlikely in
an American court.
89
See German Federal Republic Copyright Statute [hereafter “FRG”] art. 12
(translated in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1966) (Official German
text published in “Bundesgesetzblatt,” v. 9.9.1965 (BGBl. I S.1273))
(1) The author shall have the right to determine whether and how his
work is to be disseminated; (2) The right of publicly communicating
the contents of his work or a description thereof is reserved to the
author, provided that neither the work, nor its essence, nor a
description thereof has previously been publicly disseminated with
his consent.
Id.
90
See FRG, supra note 89, art. 6(1).
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published corresponds to the author’s right to determine the
conditions of publication in the United States: “whether[,] . . .
when, where and in what form first to publish a work.”91
German copyright law basically grants the author an absolute
right to control the first publication of his work. No one can
publish the work or a description thereof without the author’s
consent.92 However, this consent can also be implied — a
communication to a broad public audience can constitute a
consensual publication.93
III. THE RIGHTS OF ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY: THE BERNE
CONVENTION RIGHTS
There are certain concerns that are inherently tied to the author’s
right to control the publication and reproduction of his creation:
namely, the author’s interest in receiving title to and credit for the
product of his labors, and his interest in preventing damage to that
product.
A. The Berne Convention
Article 6bis of Berne protects the “most well-established and
almost universally accepted”94 moral rights of attribution and
integrity:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and
even after the transfer of the said rights, the author
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation
to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.95

91
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564. Cf. Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar.
14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 19.
92
See FRG, supra note 89, art. 12(2). Cf. supra note 39 and accompanying text.
93
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 61. Cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text.
94
Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 44.
95
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, at
art. 6bis(1), reprinted in World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971) 177
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Article 6bis does not require uniformity of implementation of
moral rights: “[t]he means of redress for safeguarding the rights
granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the
country where protection is claimed.”96
The attribution right empowers the author “to claim recognition
of authorship wherever and whenever a protected work is made
accessible to the public.”97 The integrity right gives the author the
right to “object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification
of . . . the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.”98 This conditioning of a violation on prejudice to the
honor or reputation of the author was done at the insistence of the
Common Law Berne members.99 The question of damage to the
honor or reputation of the author is open to different interpretations
and applications.100 In addition, the right of integrity does not
prohibit the complete destruction of a work by its owner.101
B. American Protection of Moral Rights: An Equitable Rule of
Reason.

1. No Express Rights
No provision of the Copyright Act, other statute, or the common
law grants the author an express right of attribution or integrity.102

(1978).
96
Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis(3).
97
Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 44.
98
Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis(1).
99
See STROWEL, supra note 80, at 508. This formula had a greater resemblance to
the familiar common law concepts of defamation and unfair competition. Id. The
original proposal used the term “moral interests.” Id.
100
See WILHELM NORDEMANN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING
RIGHTS LAW 87-88 (1990).
101
See infra notes 295-97, 302-04 and accompanying text.
102
With the exception of visual works of art. See infra notes 260-93 and
accompanying text.
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2. “Well-Recognized” Rights
At the core, “there is no question that [the rights of attribution
and integrity are] well-recognized within the fabric of U.S. law.”103
The moral rights contained in and required by Berne’s Article 6bis
are equivalent to rights long recognized by the common law as
inherent elements of the author’s interests in his work.104
Although the appellation “moral rights” is a stranger to American
courts, the rights of attribution and integrity have received
continuous, albeit limited, protection under the common law and
statutory law. These equivalent rights attach at the moment of
creation and generally protect the author’s work from uses that
exceed his reasonable consent. The failure to attribute or a severe
alteration can injure the author by denying him credit for, or
changing, the substance of his creation.
3. Equivalent Rights: The Unfair Use Doctrine.
Thus, American law provides a number of alternative means of
protecting an author’s interests in attribution and integrity. These
alternatives derive from an equitable rule of reason. An agreement
to publish, or a transfer of the copyright, implies that the work will
be used in a reasonable manner. In every contract “there exists an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” and a party must
refrain from actions that harm or destroy the rights of the other
party.105 An “author’s consent to a reasonable use of his
copyrighted works has always been implied by the courts as a
necessary incident of the constitutional policy of promoting the
progress of science and the useful arts . . . .”106 This implied
reasonable use was applied to support the common law policy of
fair use.107 But it also means that an unreasonable, unfair use of
the work implicitly violates the author’s consent to the use of his
work. This “‘equitable rule of reason’ . . . ‘permits courts to avoid
rigid application of the copyright statute when . . . it would stifle
103

3 NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.02(D)(1).
See infra notes 115-224 and accompanying text.
105
See Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933). See
also Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 327 (1920) (Clarke and Pitney, JJ., dissenting).
106
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (1985) (citing HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
107
See id. at 549.
104
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the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’”108
In concordance with this unfair use doctrine, American law
generally protects an author’s moral rights unless he expressly
consents to waive them. Uses of the work that exceed the
reasonable author’s consent and that could affect his creative drive
are treated as infringements of the author’s rights. Thus, no
reasonable expectation of moral rights contradicts the public
interest. In fact, the public shares an interest in knowing the true
source of a work and in receiving the work in unadulterated form.
Accordingly, market practices also generally respect moral
rights. There are few incentives for publishers to violate an
author’s interests in attribution and integrity. The publisher has a
strong incentive to use the author’s name and work faithfully. The
publisher’s product is the author’s work. The publisher has an
interest in using the author’s name in connection with the product.
The public wants to know the source of a work and purchases
Intentionally
many works according to their source.109
misattributing the work or altering its integrity to an extent that it
could damage the author’s reputation would: (i) undermine the
economic value of the author’s work; (ii) undermine the value of
future works by that author; (iii) dissuade other authors from
contracting with the publisher; and, (iv) injure the publisher’s
reputation in the eyes of the public, should the substitution or
mutilation become public knowledge.110 In short, a reasonable
publisher recognizes that he cannot make an unreasonable use of
the author’s work.
4. Pre-Publication Protection
Courts recognize that an author has an exclusive right to
property in his work.111 The author’s property right is “absolute
until he voluntarily parts with” it.112 This right includes the right
to determine “whether . . . when, where, by whom, and in what

108
109
110
111

Id. at 550.
See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981).
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., Palmer, 47 N.Y. at 537 (“Its basis is property”); Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at

346.

112

American Tobacco, 207 U.S. at 299.
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form” the work will be published.113 The Supreme Court
confirmed this interpretation in 1985.114 Thus, the protection of
moral rights under American law is absolute prior to publication.
5. Post-Publication Protection
United States law has consistently protected various aspects of
the author’s rights to attribution and integrity after publication.
The Copyright Act indirectly protects aspects of the author’s
attribution and integrity rights. In addition, an author can pursue a
number of common law and statutory claims outside of the
Copyright Act that prevent an unfair use of the author’s work.
IV. THE RIGHT OF ATTRIBUTION
The right of attribution entails three interrelated rights: (i) the
right to claim recognition as the author of a work; (ii) the right to
use an alternative attribution — to remain anonymous or to use a
pseudonym; and, (iii) the right to prevent a false attribution, i.e., to
prevent others from inaccurately describing the author’s
contribution to a certain work.
A. The Right to Claim Authorship

1. United States Law
American law protects the right to claim authorship in a number
of ways, starting with the Copyright Act. A major purpose of
copyright is to prevent another person from misappropriating the
author’s work. If another person takes the author’s work and
claims it as his own, he is violating the author’s copyright.
After a transfer of the copyright, the author usually maintains his
right to claim attribution. First, the author can preserve his right by
contract. A contract clause providing for attribution will be
113

Palmer, 47 N.Y. at 536.
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (holding that an author has the right to
determine “whether . . . when, where, and in what form first to publish a work”).
114
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enforced by courts.115 Such a provision will be extended to cover
“any production based upon the author’s work.”116
Second, even if a contract is silent regarding attribution, a right
to claim authorship can be implied. The failure to attribute can
constitute a breach of contract, because attribution “necessarily
affects [the author’s] reputation and standing, and thus impairs or
increases his future earning capacity”:117 the author’s reputation is
his “stock in trade” and the failure to attribute can cause him
“irreparable injury.”118 A contractual obligation to provide
attribution can also be inferred by the “custom and usage” of the
industry in question.119 If an implied right to claim authorship is
found, the author is entitled to injunctive relief or damages.120
A contract is usually interpreted according to its terms. Under
the Copyright Act, an author has certain rights which he can
transfer individually or collectively. The right to claim authorship
is not among those rights. The author has no statutory right to
attribution. Conversely, the transferee gains no contractual right to
claim authorship absent an express provision, even if the author
transfers the work in its entirety. No inference can be made that
the author transfers the right to attribution automatically when he
transfers the copyright.121 To do so would contradict the purpose
of the Copyright Clause and constitute unfair competition.122
115
See, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952); Paramount Prods.,
Inc. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied 302 U.S. 749 (1937).
116
3 NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.03(A)(3).
117
Clemens v. Press Publ’g Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 208 (Sup. Ct. App. Term. 1910)
(finding the terms of the contract implied that attribution was an element of the contract).
See also Granz, 198 F.2d at 588 (holding that harm to an author’s reputation warrants
relief).
118
See Poe v. Michael Todd Co., 151 F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (finding
sufficient showing by author to grant a trial under contract law for a screen play where
the exact terms of the contract were uncertain).
119
See Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See
also Poe, 151 F. Supp. at 802.
120
See, e.g., Granz, 198 F.2d at 588 (holding injunctive relief appropriate since harm
is irreparable and damages are difficult to prove); Poe, 151 F. Supp. at 802 (ruling
damages trial appropriate where plaintiff filed too late for injunctive relief but damage to
his reputation could constitute an irreparable injury).
121
The copyright is originally the author’s. It is a right to the use of the author’s
work. Even if the author transfers all use-rights to the publisher, the work is still
originally the author’s product. Just as a distributor who purchases goods wholesale for
resale, the publisher has no automatic right to remove the “label of origin” from the
author’s product. Only an express contractual waiver would suffice for such a finding.
122
Not receiving recognition would stymie the author’s incentive to create. See, e.g.,
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Thus, even if an author has no right under the Copyright Act or
contract law, he still maintains a right to pursue a common law or
statutory claim for unfair competition. The Copyright Act does not
pre-empt claims under the theory of unfair competition.123 Unfair
competition has two forms: passing-off and reverse passing-off.
Passing off consists of selling goods as those of another in a
manner that would actually or likely deceive the public.124
Reverse passing-off occurs when one sells the goods of another as
one’s own in a manner that would actually or likely deceive the
public.
In International News Service v. Associated Press the Supreme
Court held that reverse passing-off constituted “misappropriation,”
Although “unfair
and therefore unfair competition.125
competition” implies competition between two similar products,
the “invocation of equity rests more vitally upon the unfairness” of
the product’s representation.126 Using a particular author’s name
on the packaging and advertising for a work will almost always
indicate to the public that it is that author’s work.127 Replacing the
author’s name will mislead the public that another author produced
the work.
The crux of the issue in misappropriation cases — similar to the
standard applied in copyright cases — is “whether the defendant’s
activities are likely to destroy the incentives for plaintiff and others
in its position to engage in the relevant productive or creative
activities.”128 Thus, in Smith v. Montoro (hereinafter “Smith”), the
Ninth Circuit granted an actor relief under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.129 Section 43(a) is the “federal counterpart to state
Poe, 151 F. Supp. at 803 (finding irreparable injury would occur for failure to credit);
Clemens, 122 N.Y.S. at 208 (stating that attribution “necessarily affects [the author’s]
reputation and standing, and thus impairs or increases his future earning capacity”).
123
See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234-45 (1918)
[hereinafter “INS”].
124
See, e.g., id.; Gardella v. Log Cabin Prod., Co., 89 F.2d 891, 896 (2d Cir. 1937).
125
248 U.S. at 242. See also id. at 247 (“The ordinary case [is passing-off,] but the
same evil may follow from the opposite falsehood . . . [T]he principle that condemns the
one condemns the other.”) (Holmes, J., dissenting); ROGER E. SCHECHTER, UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 123 (2d ed. 1993).
126
See Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924).
127
See Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(advertising and selling records that gave impression that Jimi Hendrix was the primary
performer misled the public).
128
SCHECHTER, supra note 125, at 123. See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 541-52.
129
648 F.2d at 607 (Section 43(a) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1997)).
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[common law] unfair competition laws.”130 In Smith an actor sued
the defendant for removing and replacing his name in credits and
advertisements for a film in which the actor had starred.131 The
court found a violation of § 43(a) for “a false designation of
origin” or false “representation.”132 The court reasoned that “being
accurately credited” was of “critical” importance to the livelihoods
of actors.133 This reasoning would be equally or even more
compelling and applicable to the primary authors — director,
screenwriter, score-composer, producer — of motion pictures and
to the authors of other types of works.134
The Lanham Act grants an author the right to “ensure that his or
her name is associated with a work when the work is used.”135
Section 43(a) “may be used to prevent ‘the misappropriation of
credit properly belonging to the original creator.’”136 The
“misappropriation is of the artistic talent required to create the
work, not the manufacturing talent required” to publish the
work.137 A Section 43(a) claim is “separate and distinct from a
claim of copyright infringement.”138 As a result, the right still
applies to works in the public domain, and is theoretically
perpetual.
Section 43(a) does not require that the parties be in competition
with each other: “any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged” by a misrepresentation of origin or false
advertisement can invoke the section.139 But the cause of action
130
Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks, Final Report of the Register of
Copyrights, March 1, 1996, at 71.
131
See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 602.
132
See id. at 603. The Ninth Circuit found the defendant’s actions constituted “reverse
passing off” — ”the unauthorized removal or obliteration of the original
trademark . . . before the resale of such goods.” 3 NIMMER, supra note 2, at §
8D.03(A)(2).
133
Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 607.
134
See 3 NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.03(A)(2). The California Business and
Professions Code provides a remedy based on the principle formulated by the Ninth Circuit
in Smith v. Montoro. See also Meta-Film Assocs., Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346
(C.D. Cal. 1984).
135
Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994).
136
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 5, comment c; 2
NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8.21(E)).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (1997) (Section 43(a) reads:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . .
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
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must be based on more than a plaintiff’s subjective belief. In order
to proceed the author must have a commercial interest, which is
usually defined as a “reasonable interest to be protected.”140
Because his name and reputation are of “critical importance” and
“his stock in trade,” the author will almost always have a
reasonable commercial interest.141
Thus, the author has extensive rights to claim authorship of his
work. Federal law grants him the copyright and the right to make a
claim under the Lanham Act for misappropriation of his work.
Under state law, the author can pursue contract-based rights or a
common law unfair competition claim.
Only an express
contractual waiver should suffice to deny a right to claim
authorship: if the author divests himself completely “by plain and
unambiguous language . . . of every vestige of title and ownership
of the [work], as well as the right to [its] possession, control and
use,” he also divests himself of the right to claim authorship.142
2. Continental Law
Both French and German law contain similar provisions
protecting an author’s right of attribution. French law requires that

combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation
of fact, which —
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services , or commercial activities, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
— shall be liable in a civil action . . . .
Id.

140
See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 605 (quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of
Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1979).
141
See supra notes 118 & 133 and accompanying text.
142
Vargas, 164 F.2d at 525 (finding against plaintiff where he transferred all rights in
the work and agreed specifically that the use of certain designations derived from his name
and used in connection with his work belonged to the defendant). See also Harris v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding against
author where she retained no rights of property in the work and knew that she would not
receive attribution before the contract was signed). Express waivers are permissible under
Berne.
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the author’s name appear on every copy of the work.143 German
copyright law provides that the “author shall have the right of
recognition of his authorship of the work” and that the author
determines “whether the work is to bear an author’s designation
and what designation is to be used.”144 Both laws also require that
the author must receive recognition every time his work is
quoted.145
French law contains further and stricter attribution requirements.
All advertisements and publicity materials related to a work must
give the author credit.146 Even if he contracts to use a pseudonym
or remain anonymous, the author can demand recognition under
his own name at any time and is entitled to damages if the demand
is ignored.147
These provisions are not, however, without their limitations. In
Germany, when the author has not expressly contracted to protect
the right to attribution, the right can be limited under certain
circumstances — the author is precluded from claiming authorship
if the custom and usage of the industry, good faith, or the nature of
an employment relationship weigh against attribution.148

143
See, e.g., DIETZ, supra note 15, at 116-26; Russel J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the
Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 27 (1980). Article 6 of the French law provides: “the author
enjoys the right of respect for his name, for his authorship, and for his work.” [“L’auteur
jouit du droit au respect de son nom, de sa qualite et de son oeuvre.”] Law No. 57-298 of
Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 6. The distinction between name and
authorship is somewhat unclear. DIETZ, supra note 15, at 117. The author has the right
“to demand that the work is published under his name or chosen designation.” Johnny
Hess, Trib. civ., Seine, Feb. 2, 1950, G.P. 1950, 1, 367, cited in DIETZ, supra note 15, at
123. Cf. supra note 135 and accompanying text.
144
FRG, supra note 89, art. 13. This right was recognized by courts prior to the
implementation of the law. Landesgericht Hamburg, 26.2.1958, DdA 1959, 135,
Bundesgerichtshof, 19.10.1962, GRUR 1963, 40. Architektenurteil, Reichsgericht,
8.4.1925, RGZ 110, 393. But generally, there is little case law in Germany on this right.
The statute adopted the prevailing opinion of German theorists. DIETZ, supra note 15, at
117, 122. Cf. supra note 135 and accompanying text.
145
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 121-22; FRG, supra note 89, art. 63. There are a few
exceptions. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
146
See Trib. civ., Seine, Feb. 20, 1922, G.P. 1922, 2, 282. In the U.S., the Lanham
Act would protect against replacing the author’s name with another, but the result in a
case of pure deletion of the name would be uncertain. See supra notes 115-142, infra
note 376 and accompanying text.
147
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 120. Guille c. Colmant, CA, Paris, G.P., 1, 17.
148
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 121. See infra notes 325-328 and accompanying text.
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French law tempers the author’s right by limiting his means of
redress. In general, French law gives a broad right to sue, but a
limited right to recover. Often, the author is entitled only to
damages for a failure to attribute.149 For example, in the case of
Johnny Hess, the author’s name was replaced with that of another
in film credits.150 The court granted damages even though the
author had transferred his complete interests in the song, but the
court refused to enjoin the film.151 In Louiguy, the author received
only one franc in damages. The court found that the failure to
attribute damaged only the author’s moral interests and did not
damage his earnings capacity because he was already
internationally famous and successful.152 In short, French law
limits damages for a failure to attribute absent an economic injury.
B. Right of Alternative Attribution: The Right to Remain
Unknown.

1. United States Law
The Copyright Act takes for granted that an author can publish
his work under an alternative designation,153 but the author does
not have any express right to use a pseudonym or remain
anonymous.
If the author maintains the copyright, he can control the manner
in which the work is published, including the attribution used on
the work. Furthermore, the author can guarantee alternative
attribution by an express contract provision.
Moreover, courts will recognize an author’s rights to use a
particular pseudonym. Under common law and statutory unfair
competition, he can prevent anyone else from using his established
149

See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 123-24.
See Johnny Hess, Trib. civ., Seine, Feb. 2, 1950, G.P. 1950, 1, 367, cited in DIETZ,
supra note 15, at 123. Cf. supra note 131 and accompanying text.
151
Cf. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 602 (the Ninth Circuit came to a similar result).
See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
152
Trib. gr. inst. Seine, , Jan. 12, 1960, RIDA No. XXXI, 101 (1961), Paris, Mar. 14,
1962, Ann. 1962, 277, cited in DIETZ, supra note 15, at 123.
153
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (determining duration of copyright for “Anonymous
Works, Pseudonymous Works, and Works Made for Hire”). The Copyright Act of 1909
also had such a provision. Ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909).
150
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pseudonym for a work: (i) he did not create; or, (ii) which
“substantially departs” from the original work; or, (iii) where there
is a “tendency to deceive the public.”154 An author is also entitled
to continue using an established pen name after he ends an
employment relationship with an employer.155
Whether an author can prevent a transferee from using his real
name against his wishes, however, is uncertain in the absence of a
contractual provision. The U.S. usually follows a rule of truthful
attribution, i.e., an accurate description of an author’s connection
to a work.156 Using the author’s real name is a true attribution.
Absent an express provision, only an unreasonable use of the
author’s true name will incur liability unless the author has
recourse to another cause of action.157
2. Continental Law
French law does not expressly protect the right to alternative
attribution, however the provisions of Articles 6 and 11 of the
French Copyright law make it clear that the author has a right to
use a pseudonym or remain anonymous.158 The German law
protects the right expressly.159 Both laws prevent the publisher
from revealing the author’s true identity, against his will, on the
work or any copy.160
Unlike French law, the German law binds the author to the terms
of the contract if an author expressly contracts to use an alternative

154
See, e.g., Geisel, 295 F. Supp. at 354; Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728,
731 (N.D. Ill. 1883); Munroe v. Tousey, 13 N.Y.S. 79, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
155
See Landa v. Greenberg, 24 T.L.R. 441(1908).
156
See, e.g., Geisel, 295 F. Supp. 331. See also NIMMER, supra note 2, at §
8D.03(B)(2).
157
If a court found that an author reasonably expected to remain unknown and that the
revelation of his identity would stymie his creative drive, it might be inclined to rule for
him. The author might also be able to pursue an action for invasion of privacy. For
example, the New York Civil Rights Law prevents the use of a person’s name, portrait or
picture for advertising purposes without the person’s written consent. If the author had
never used his real name, he would be protected, but the case would be less certain if he
had used his real name in connection with another work. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51
(1992). See infra note 173 discussing the right to privacy.
158
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 116-19.
159
See FRG, supra note 89, art. 13.
160
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 119.
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attribution.161 An exception applies to this scenario if the author
must prove his authorship in response to attacks on it,162 or if the
work enjoys unforeseeable success.163
Absent any express
provision, the law will imply the right of an author to use his real
name instead of an alternative attribution whenever he wishes to do
so.164
Thus, despite differences in form with respect to their American
counterpart, the right of the author to prevent revelation of his true
identity by third persons in France and Germany will similarly
depend on the individual circumstances.165
C. Right to Prevent False Attribution

1. United States Law
American law grants the author extensive rights to prevent false
attribution. An author can prevent the attribution to him of a work:
(i) that he did not create; (ii) which departs substantially from his
original work; or, (iii) which inaccurately describes the author’s
connection to the work.166
Originally, the common law enforced these protections as
independent, authors’ rights and “incidentally, to prevent fraud
upon the purchasers.”167 An author was protected “against having
any literary matter published as his work which is not actually his
creation.”168 This included situations where the author actually
created a portion of the work, but the entire work was falsely
161

See id. at 121.
For example, if someone questions his authorship of a work or someone else
claims to be the author. See id.
163
See id.
164
See id.
165
For example, the degree to which the author defends himself against revelations of
his true identity will influence any determination. See id. If an author defends himself
vigilantly against revelation, he will win; if he placidly tolerates revelation and then
protests, he will lose. See id. Cf. supra note 157 and accompanying text.
166
See Granz, 198 F.2d at 588; Geisel, 295 F. Supp. at 354.
167
Drummond v. Altemus, 60 F. 338, 339 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1894).
168
Id. at 338 (“That such right exists is too well settled, upon reason and authority.”).
See also Clemens, 14 F. at 731 (finding an author “may restrain another from the
publication of literary matter purporting to have been written by him, but which, in fact,
was never so written”); Lord Byron v. Johnston, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (Ch. 1816).
162
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attributed to the author.169 In such scenarios, the right was
independent of copyright: it was enforceable whether or not the
author still held a copyright in the work.170
During the twentieth century, these independent author’s rights
were absorbed by the common law of unfair competition.171 False
attribution is the classic case of falsely passing-off goods as those
of another. Accordingly, the author can pursue an unfair
competition claim under the Lanham Act Section 43(a), or under
state law for the misrepresentation of the work’s origin when the
attribution is absolutely false, inaccurately describes his role, or the
work is substantially altered.172 In addition, the author can pursue
a state law tort claim for defamation or invasion of privacy.173

169

See Drummond, 60 F. at 338-39; Lord Byron, 35 Eng. Rep. At 851. Both cases
involved works containing some material created by the respective author, but designated
as being completely by that author.
170
See, e.g., Drummond, 60 F. at 338-39; Clemens, 14 F. at 730-31.
171
See, e.g., Granz, 198 F.2d 588; Yameta, 279 F. Supp. at 585; Samuelson v.
Producer’s Distrib. Co., 1 Ch. 201 (1931).
172
See Geisel, 295 F. Supp. at 353; Yameta, 279 F. Supp. at 585 (finding a violation
of the Lanham Act where packaging and advertising gave the false impression that Jimi
Hendrix was the primary artist, when in fact he only provided background
accompaniment). See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
173
When an infringing work is of inferior quality and therefore threatens the author’s
reputation, he can sue for defamation. See, e.g., Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 168
N.E.2d 643 (1960), appeal denied 174 N.E.2d 609 (1961); Ben-Oliel v. Press Publ’g Co.,
167 N.E. 432 (1929).
The author might also invoke a tort claim for invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Follet
v. Arbor House Publ’g Co., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Eliot v. Jones, 120 N.Y.S.
989 (Sup. Ct. 1910), aff’d 125 N.Y.S. 1119 (1st Dep’t 1910). The right to privacy
incorporates four torts: 1) an intrusion upon a person’s solitude, 2) a publication placing
person in a false light, 3) a public disclosure of private facts, and 4) appropriation of a
person’s name or likeness. SCHECHTER, supra note 125, at 125.
For false attribution to a work he did not create, an author can make a claim under
the “false light” theory, based on a “misappropriation of the unique personal
characteristics of the author and the unflattering exposure of these characteristics to the
public.” Deborah Ross, Comment, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New
Obligations for Moral Rights?, 68 N.C. L. REV. 363, 377 (1990). Two cases involving
garbled or mimicked presentations of musicians’ works found violations based generally
on this theory. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (using a
double to mimic Bette Midler’s voice in Ford’s television advertisements); Big Seven
Music Corp. v. Lennon, 554 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (record company sold “fuzzy”
copies of John Lennon’s works). Such a finding entitles the author to an injunction. See
Midler, 849 F.2d at 460.
When a person is misrepresented as the author of a work to which he has a
connection but that he did not personally create, he can base his claim on the “public
disclosure of private facts” theory of invasion of privacy. Zim v. West Publ’g Co., 573
F.2d 1318, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1978). In Zim the publisher of science books originally
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2. Continental Law
Both French and German copyright law grant an author the right
to prevent the use of his name in connection with a substantially
altered work.174 However, neither country’s law protects the right
to prevent attribution for a work the author did not create. This
right is protected by the more general “law of personality,” similar
in some respects to the common law right to privacy.175
V. THE RIGHT OF INTEGRITY
The right of integrity is often considered the most essential
element of moral rights.176 The right of integrity protects two
interrelated concerns: 1) the author’s interest in preserving the
integrity of his work, and 2) the author’s interest in preserving his
reputation — a major factor in the marketability of his works.177
Berne recognizes this dichotomous purpose by granting the author
the right to 1) “object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of . . . the . . . work,” that 2) “would be prejudicial to
his honor or reputation.”178 Thus, Berne’s right of integrity
authored by Zim published and sold a revision of the books naming Zim as the author
without first obtaining the author’s consent. The elements of “public disclosure of private
facts” are: 1) publication of private information (i.e., the plaintiff’s name), and 2) a
reasonable person would object to such publication.
Finally, an author could rely on the “right to publicity.” The right to publicity
“protects against the unauthorized commercial use of a person’s name, likeness or other
personal attributes in a way that causes commercial damage to the plaintiff.” SCHECHTER,
supra note 125, at 125. Actionable causes have included: 1) the imitation of a performer’s
voice, Midler, 849 F.2d at 460; 2) the use of celebrity doubles, Allen v. National Video,
Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); and 3) the unauthorized appropriation and
broadcast of a circus performer’s act, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S.
562 (1977) (filming and broadcast of human cannonball’s act without his consent could
harm his ability to earn a living).
174
See DaSilva, supra note 143, at 28. See also DIETZ, supra note 15, at 99, 116-126.
175
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 117-19. Continental lawyers consider that this right
protects the author qua author instead of protecting his work of authorship. The
American and Continental systems are both premised on protecting authors’ specific
interests in their works. Copyright law does not apply to general questions of honor,
privacy or reputation.
176
See STROWEL, supra note 99, at 479.
177
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 111. An author’s expression — the work — is a
reflection of the author’s personality — his experiences, education, and personal and
professional integrity. A mutilation or malevolent alteration of the work will reflect
poorly on the author. See, e.g., supra notes 205-24 and accompanying text.
178
Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis(1).
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requires an alteration to be sufficiently substantial to prejudice the
author’s honor or reputation to be actionable.
A. United States Law
American copyright law recognizes no right of integrity per se.
But the Copyright Act, the Common Law, and Section 43 (a) of the
Lanham Act provide a number of protections for the right of
integrity.
1. The Copyright Act

a. Prohibition of Copying
For 250 years, the prohibition of copying another’s work has
also served to protect the integrity of a work in Common Law
copyright systems. In addition to protecting the whole work, the
Copyright Act protects against any unauthorized use of a
substantial part of the work.
American courts have traditionally followed British precedent
that any use of a “substantial part of the work” constitutes
copyright infringement.179 Citing numerous British cases, Justice
Story held in 1841 that:
179
See Cooper v. Stevens, 1 Ch. 567 (1895). Beginning in the mid-eighteenth
century, British courts distinguished between valid abridgements of a work and
alterations that infringed the copyright. See, e.g., Gyles v. Wilcox, 22 Eng. Rep. 586 (Ch.
1740); Bell v. Walker, 28 Eng. Rep. 1235 (Ch. 1785); Butterworth v. Robinson, 31 Eng.
Rep. 817 (Ch. 1801). A “true and proper abridgement” existed when an author invested
his own labor, skill, judgment, and expression to convey the sense of another author’s
work without using the substance of the other’s work. VII R.C. CASES, supra note 54, at
94. An infringing use was found when an author made only a “colourable abridgement,”
meaning he copied the substance of another’s work rather than investing a high degree of
labor, skill, and judgment to create a new work. VII R.C. CASES, supra note 54, at 94. A
use that communicated “the same knowledge” as the original work was “an actionable
violation of literary property.” See Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at 348 (quoting Roworth v.
Wilkes, 170 Eng. Rep 889 (1894). The intent of the abridger was immaterial: “it is
enough, that the publication . . . is in substance a copy, whereby a work vested in another
is prejudiced.” Id. Thus, the quality of the material used, not the quantity, was the key
factor. In Cooper v. Stevens, the Court of Chancery found a single illustration from a
book of designs a “substantial part of the work” and held the defendant liable for using it.
1 Ch. 567 (1895).

GUNLICKS.PP1

632

9/6/01 10:41 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:601

It is certainly not necessary, to constitute an
invasion of copyright, that the whole of a work
should be copied, or even a large portion of it, in
form or in substance. If so much is taken, that the
value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the
labors of the original author are substantially to an
injurious extent appropriated by another, that is
sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro
tanto. The entirety of the copyright is the property
of the author; and it is no defence, that another
person has appropriated a part, and not the whole,
of any property.180
In short, the quantity taken does not determine the outcome.181
More important is the quality, the “value of the materials taken[]
and the importance of it to the sale of the original work.”182 For
example, a “reviewer may . . . cite largely from the original
work . . . for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism” but not
“to supersede the use of the original work.”183 And a fair
abridgement is not the “facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the
essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work.”184
It “must be [a] real, substantial condensation of the materials, and
intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon.”185
These rules on abridgments are now incorporated into the fair
use exception of the Copyright Act.186 But the level of protection
is essentially the same: “a use that supplants any part of the normal
market for a copyrighted work would ordinarily be considered an
infringement.”187 In order “to negate fair use one need only show
180

Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at 348.
See id.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 344-45.
184
Id. at 345.
185
Id.
186
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997). See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 (“As
[Folsom v. Marsh] illustrates, the fair use doctrine has always precluded a use that
‘supersede[s] the use of the original.’”). See supra note 74.
187
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (citing Senate Report). The fair use test is more
complex than the factors weighed in the earlier abridgement cases. The fair use factors
are: 1) the purpose and character of the use; 2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used; and 4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997). The
major emphasis of fair use is on the effect of the use on the market value of the original
work. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. Cf. supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text.
181
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that if the challenged use ‘should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.’”188
If someone appropriates the author’s labors for profit, he will
normally affect the market value of the author’s work. Moreover,
the potential impact on the market for derivative works must also
be considered.189
b. Derivative Works
Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act grants the copyright owner
the sole right to produce “derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work.”190 A derivative work is “based upon one or
more preexisting works . . . [that] may be recast, transformed, or
adapted[; a] work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship.”191
When someone has the right to make a derivative work, he must
“give appropriate expression to the theme, thought, and main
action”, i.e., substance of the original.192 The copyright for the
authorized derivative work extends only to “the novel additions
made to the underlying [original] work and the derivative work
does not affect the ‘force or validity’ of the copyright” in the
original work.193 As a result, a party that has rights to adapt a
derivative work cannot exceed the permission granted by the
author or owner of the original copyright when it makes the
derivative work.194
An unauthorized derivative work is a copyright infringement if it
“incorporate[s] a portion of the copyrighted work in some
188
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
189
See id.
190
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1997).
191
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1997).
192
Curwood v. Affiliated Distribs., Inc., 283 F. 219, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1922)
(“elaboration of a story means something other than that [the storyline] should be
discarded, and its title and authorship applied to a wholly dissimilar tale”).
193
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20.
194
See id. For example, if a “copyright owner of an underlying work limits his consent
for its use in a derivative work to a given medium (e.g. opera), the copyright owner of the
derivative work may not exploit such derivative work in a different medium (e.g. motion
pictures) to the extent the derivative work incorporates protectible material from the
underlying work.” Id. at 20 n.4.
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form . . . .”195 Thus, a person who prepares a work incorporating
any portions of the original work without the copyright owner’s
consent infringes on the copyright “whether or not prejudicial to
the author’s reputation.”196
c. Conclusion
The provisions of the Copyright Act regarding fair use and
derivative works prevent a violation of the right of integrity. Any
unauthorized use of a key portion or of the substance of a work
will be an infringement of the copyright in that work, unless such
infringement falls under fair use or another specific exception.
These provisions effectively protect the author’s right to
integrity versus third parties. With regard to the rights of the
author vis-à-vis his publisher, however, the right to integrity
provided by the Copyright Act is limited. The publisher is
authorized to make use of the original work. Because the rights in
Section 106 are divisible, the author can enforce his right to
integrity against a publisher who prepares an unauthorized
derivative work.197 In the case of an absolute transfer of copyright,
however, an infringing derivative work would infringe the
copyright owner’s, rather than the author’s, right. The author’s
right to prevent non-consensual alterations after a transfer or
licensing of the copyright would depend largely on the language of
the contract or on alternative common law and statutory causes of
action.
2. The Predominance of Contract Law
Under the traditional rule, an author has no right to prevent
alteration if he did not reserve the right to integrity at the time of
contracting, i.e.,: the author’s “so-called ‘moral right’ is controlled
by the law of contract.”198 Thus, if the author contractually grants
195

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, reprinted in 17 U.S.C. at 909 (1994).
See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 554 (1986).
197
Prior to 1976 the copyright was not divisible. HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 46-47 (1944). This principle weakened the
author’s control over the uses of his work.
198
Edison v. Viva Int’l, Ltd., 421 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (1st Dep’t. 1979). See also Seroff
196
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a transferee or licensee the right to make changes to his work, he
cannot later hinder such alterations;199 the author can, however,
expressly reserve the right to prevent changes.200 But minimal
changes to modernize the work201 or which are necessary to
present the work in another, author-approved, medium might be
permitted without the author’s consent.202 For example, a film
producer did not have the right to enjoin Columbia from inserting
commercials into the television versions of his films, although the
contract reserved to him the right to approve all final edits.203
This traditional rule is not, however, absolute. Where a contract
is silent regarding alterations, “the parties will be deemed to have
adopted the custom prevailing in the [particular] trade or
industry.”204 Thus, unreasonable changes that are not required by
the medium in which the work is presented or that exceed industry
practices are not preempted by the contract.
3. Unfair Competition
Consequently, a publisher does not have the right to make
changes that unreasonably alter the substance of a work. When
“the use being made of her literary production [is] such as to injure
the reputation of the work and of the author” and amounts to a
deception of the public, the author can make a claim under unfair
competition.205 When the publisher uses the author’s name to sell
v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 162 N.Y.S.2d 770, 775 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff’d, 210 N.Y.S.2d 479
(1st Dep’t 1960), appeal denied, 21 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1st Dep’t 1961); Crimi v. Rutgers
Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (“The time for the artist to have
reserved any rights was when he and his attorney participated in the drawing of the contract
with the church.”).
199
See, e.g., Seroff, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 770; Dreiser v. Paramount Publix Corp., 22
COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 106 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Jones v. Am. Law Book Co., 109 N.Y.S. 706
(1st Dep’t 1908).
200
See, e.g., Manners v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 262 F. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1919);
Royle v. Dillingham, 104 N.Y.S. 783 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1392
n.10 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 828, (1993) (an author may insure “‘quality
control and high standards in the exploitation’ of her creative work”) (quoting Clifford Ross
Co. v. Nelvana, Ltd., 710 F. Supp. 517, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
201
See Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 14 (Ct.
App. 1962). See also NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.04(A)(1).
202
See NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.04(A)(1). See also Manners, 262 F. at 811.
203
See Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff’d
269 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep’t 1966), aff’d 219 N.E.2d 431 (1966).
204
Id. at 598.
205
Prouty v. NBC, 26 F. Supp. 265, 266 (D. Mass. 1939).
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a “garbled version” of a work that “substantially departs from the
original,” he is giving the false impression that he is actually
selling the author’s work and is guilty of unfair competition.206
The unfair competition will usually be evident and automatic, since
the use of the author’s name will almost always deceive the public
that it is the author’s work.207 The result is that the question in an
unfair competition case ultimately comes down to the standard for
the right of integrity under Berne: whether a use is injurious to the
work and reputation of the author.208
Thus, in a case where commercials would “so alter, adversely
affect or emasculate the artistic or pictorial quality of [a] motion
picture so as to destroy or distort materially or substantially the
mood, effect, or continuity of [the] motion picture as produced and
directed by” the author, a court will issue an injunction to prevent
the broadcast of the film on television.209 The broadcaster “must
give primary consideration” to these concerns, even if no
contractual relationship exists between the author and the
broadcaster and the author no longer holds the copyright for the
film.210
In line with the common law application of unfair competition,
and consistent with the underlying purpose of Section 43(a), the
Lanham Act grants an author a right to protect his interest in the
integrity of his work.211 In Gilliam v. ABC, the Second Circuit
determined that Section 43(a) applies when a work crediting an
author has been altered “into a form that departs substantially from
the original work” without the author’s consent.212 Furthermore,
the court found that Monty Python had a viable claim for the

206

See Granz, 198 F.2d at 589 (Frank, J., concurring).
See Yameta, 279 F. Supp. at 587 (holding that advertising and selling records that
gave impression that Jimi Hendrix was the primary performer misled the public).
208
See Prouty, 26 F. Supp. at 266. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
209
Stevens v. NBC, 148 U.S.P.Q. 755, 758 (Cal. 1966).
210
See id.
211
See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (the court based its decision on the many cases
protecting an author’s business or personal reputation where the representation of a product
“creates a false impression of the product’s origin” under both the Lanham Act and other
causes of action). See supra note 139 for the text of the Lanham Act § 43(a) (prohibiting an
act that will “deceive as to . . . origin, sponsorship, or approval,” or that “misrepresents the
nature” of, the goods). See supra notes 128-130, 205-207 and accompanying text.
212
538 F.2d at 24-25 (“an allegation that a defendant has presented to the public a
‘garbled,’ distorted version of plaintiff’s work seeks to redress the very rights sought to be
protected by the Lanham Act . . .”).
207

10:41 PMGUNLICKS.PP7

2001]

9/6/01 10:41 PM

MORAL RIGHTS IN THE WORLDWIDE ECONOMY

637

“mutilation” of its work.213 The court reasoned that authors must
be able to prevent “the mutilation or misrepresentation of their
work,” because to hold otherwise would contradict “the economic
incentive . . . that serves as the foundation of American copyright
law.”214 Under Section 43(a), an author can “vindicate [his]
personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the public
in a distorted form.”215
On the other hand, Gilliam implies that the sale of a substantially
altered work without the author’s name generally will not give rise
to a claim of unfair competition, since it would not be harmful to
the reputation and honor of the author. Such a sale could,
however, violate the terms of the publishing contract, expressly or
implicitly.216 But if the public recognizes the work as that of the
author, in spite of the omission of the author’s name, the public
actually will be deceived that it is his work and the publisher could
be held liable for defamation or invasion of privacy.217
4. Other Claims
Under certain circumstances, the author can sue for defamation
when his work has been altered, even if he has transferred the
copyright. For example, in the 1832 case Archbold v. Sweet, a
publisher issued a revised edition of an author’s work under the
author’s name without his consent.218 In holding the publisher
liable for defamation, the court reasoned that the new edition
contained substantial and incorrect alterations that injured the
author’s reputation.219 Like their English counterparts, American
courts have also recognized an author’s right to a defamation claim
for a materially altered work injurious to his reputation.220
Moreover, if a contract provides that an author’s name shall be
used in connection with the work, the sale of a substantially altered
213

See id. at 24.
Id.
215
Id.
216
See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
217
Actual confusion is required for defamation. Gardella, 89 F.2d at 896. A libel
occurs when a reasonable person recognizes that the plaintiff is the subject of the
defamation. See supra notes 173-380 and accompanying text.
218
174 Eng. Rep. 55 (N.P. 1832).
219
See id. at 57.
220
See, e.g., Edison , 421 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
214
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work will constitute a breach of contract:221 “the established rule is
that, even if the contract with the artist expressly authorizes
reasonable modifications . . . it is an actionable wrong to hold out
the artist as author of a version which substantially departs from
the original.”222 The harm to the plaintiff’s reputation and the
difficulty in determining damages can also warrant injunctive
relief.223 Although copyright law entitles the copyright holder to
publish the work without attribution, he will be liable to the author
for a breach of contract if he omits the author’s name.224
B. Continental Law

1. General
Under French and German copyright law, the right of integrity is
tempered by practical economic concerns. The laws in both
countries require an author to accept reasonable, good faith
alterations necessitated by the medium in which the work is
presented. In essence, only unauthorized and unreasonable
changes to the substance of the work will incur liability. Thus, the
degree of protection is similar to the degree provided by American
law.225
a. France
The right of integrity in France is protected by Article 6 of the
copyright law which states that, “the author enjoys the right of
respect for . . . his authorship and his work.”226 This right applies
221
See Granz, 198 F.2d at 588 (holding that sale of records where one-fourth of the
work was deleted, constituted breach of contract); Packard v. Fox Film Corp., 202 N.Y.S.
164 (1st Dep’t 1923) (finding that the unauthorized alteration of the title “was a distinct
damage to the plaintiff”).
222
Granz, 198 F.2d at 589 (Frank, J., concurring).
223
See id. at 588.
224
See Clemens, 122 N.Y.S. at 206 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
225
See supra notes 179-189, 192-205, 219, 222 and accompanying text.
226
Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 6 (“L’auteur
jouit du droit au respect . . . de sa qualite et de son oeuvre.”). Article 47, requiring theater
owners to respect the author’s work, and Article 56, requiring a book publisher to receive
consent of the author for alterations, also apply. See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 91.
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to publishers, owners of original works, and the general public.227
Furthermore, the French law applies different standards to the
reproduction or presentation of original works and the adaptation
of derivative works.228
i. Use of Original Works
French law generally obligates publishers to reproduce and
present original works faithfully and strictly, including the title and
any prefaces or introductions. But French law also takes the
interests of publishers into account.229 The publisher can make
changes required by the medium of reproduction.230 A contract
between the author and the publisher must be interpreted in good
faith.231 And an author cannot make unreasonable demands based
solely on his moral right.232
In cases of controversy, the court interprets the meaning and
scope of a contract.233 An author has the right to decide when to
sue for a violation of the integrity right, but the court makes the
final determination whether or not a violation has occurred — the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove a violation of the right.234
Furthermore, substantial editing of, or additions to, a work will
cause liability but will not usually entitle the author to have the
work confiscated or have its distribution enjoined.235 A publisher
227

See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 92.
See id. at 99.
229
See id.
230
See id.
231
See id. See infra text accompanying note 232.
232
See Lichtenstein v. KS Visions, Cass. civ. 1re, Mar. 19, 1996, 1996 Bull. Civ. I,
No. 137. In Lichtenstein, a contract determined that the work should be tailored to the
custom and usage of the medium. The author created a work substantially longer than
specified and refused to shorten the work based on her moral right to integrity. The
publisher made a good faith effort to market the work, but could not. The court then held
that the author could not demand specific performance of the contract.
233
See id.
234
See Collet & Bartoli v. Blaise, Cass. civ. 1re, Jan. 17, 1995, 1995 Bull. Civ. I, No.
39. Thus, although the right to integrity is technically a subjective right, i.e., the authorsubject has the right to decide if his integrity is impinged, the final determination is an
objective evaluation made by the court.
235
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 102. In Blanchar, the producer cut large portions of a
film for commercial reasons. The court awarded damages to the director, screenwriter
and composer of the film for a violation of the right of integrity. In Prévert & Carné, the
court awarded damages to the director and screenwriter on the same grounds, but refused
228
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also has the express right to make corrections for grammatical
errors and to edit passages offending public morals.236 If the
author refuses to allow such changes, the publisher can withdraw
from the contract.237
ii. Creation of Derivative Works
The French law grants greater flexibility for derivative works.
By its nature, a derivative work requires independent creative
effort by the adapter and requires an alteration of an original
work.238 Thus, the technological nature of the medium and the
creative rights of the adapter should be evaluated when judging
alterations.239 Changes that are necessary to the adaptation will be
allowed as long as the substance of the work is not harmed.240
The courts must seek a fair balancing of interests between the
contracting parties when ruling on the propriety of a derivative
work.241 Courts will evaluate changes to the work objectively, not
solely on the subjective opinion of the author, even when a
contract provides that the underlying nature of the original work
cannot be altered.242 Thus, as long as a motion picture adaptation
of a book maintains the essential substance of the book, the
addition, e.g., of a happy ending, will not violate the right of
integrity.243 The author’s contractual consent to changes will
usually be enforced — only malicious changes will cause an injury

to enjoin and confiscate the film. In Charlie Chaplin, the court found that the
unauthorized addition of a musical score to the film “The Kid” breached the right of
integrity and awarded damages. Id.
236
See id.
237
See id.
238
See Bernstein v. Société Pathé-cinéma, Trib. civ., Seine, July 26, 1933, D.H. 1933,
533. See also DIETZ, supra note 15, at 101.
239
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 105-06.
240
See id.
241
See Richepin v. Rivers, Trib. civ. de la Seine, Apr. 12, 1937, G.P. 1937, 2, 243.
242
See Le don d’Adéle (Barillet v. Société Burgus Films), Trib. civ. de Bordeaux, Jan.
15, 1951, G.P. 1951, 1, 372; Le Lieutenant de Gibraltar (Frondaie v. Compagnie Indust.
Et Commerciale Cinématographique), Trib. civ. de la Seine, Jan. 12, 1955, RIDA No.
VIII, 104 (1955) (detailing criteria designed to evaluate the propriety of changes: 1)
faithfulness to the underlying plot; 2) faithfulness to the flow of the plot; 3) faithfulness
to the author’s basic idea; 4) faithfulness to the psychological elements of the work; and,
5) changes required by medium of exploitation). See also DIETZ, supra note 15, at 105.
243
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 101.
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to the author’s reputation and trigger liability.244 But where the
author reserves extensive rights of control, he can void the contract
when alterations exceed his consent.245
iii. Conclusion
Thus, there is no absolute principle determining the outcome of
integrity cases in French law. Reduced to its essence, French law
makes an equitable evaluation of the facts and balances the
interests of authors, publishers, and the public on a case-by-case
basis.246
b. Germany
German copyright law has a number of provisions regarding the
integrity of the work. Section 14 of the German law provides the
author with the general right to prevent “any distortion or any other
mutilation of [the] work which would prejudice [the author’s]
lawful intellectual or personal interests in the work.”247 The statute
also stipulates that a licensee may not alter a work, its title, or the
designation of the author in the absence of the author’s consent.248
But the German law also provides that the author is bound by good
faith to accept necessary alterations.249 The law makes no
distinction between original and derivative works, thereby
indicating that any alterations made necessary by the authorized
use of the work are allowed.
The terms used in the German provisions on the right to integrity
— ”justified interests,” “consent,” “good faith,” “necessary
244

See Bernstein v. Société Pathé-cinéma, Trib. civ., Seine, July 26, 1933, D.H. 1933,
533. Cf. note 220 and accompanying text.
245
See Richepin v. Rivers, Trib. civ. de la Seine, Apr. 12, 1937, G.P. 1937, 2, 243.
Under American contract law, an author could rescind the contract if the publisher failed
to perform essential conditions of the contract. See also BALL, supra note 197, at 591
(noting that under U.S. contract law, an author could rescind the contract if the publisher
failed to perform essential conditions of the contract).
246
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 115. And the remedy available to the author might be
limited even when a violation is found. See also supra notes 149-152 and accompanying
text.
247
FRG, supra note 89, art. 14.
248
See id. art. 39(1).
249
See id. art. 39(2).
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alterations,” “interests of others” — clarify that the author’s right
to integrity is limited. And the custom and usage of the respective
industry must also be taken into account.250 German courts
determine whether a violation has occurred by objectively
balancing the interests and evaluating the particular circumstances
on a case-by-case basis251 — the “author’s interests should be
weighed against possibly opposing equally justified interests.”252
2. Motion Pictures and Public Performances
Both Continental systems contain special provisions for public
performances and motion pictures. In France, for example, theater
directors are strictly required to present a work faithfully, but they
have a certain degree of their own artistic and creative freedom
when presenting the work.253 German law grants performers the
right to prohibit any distortion or alteration of their performances
that would injure their honor or reputation as performers, but
requires that they take the interests of the other performers into
account.254
With regard to motion pictures, moral rights essentially prevent
only unauthorized, unreasonable changes, and thus, these
protections would not seem to differ significantly from their
counterparts for motion pictures in the United States.255 French
and German law consider the director, the screenwriter, and the
score-composer of a film the authors of the picture.256 Under
French law, they can exercise their moral rights individually or
collectively, but they cannot exercise a right against each other to

250
See STROWEL, supra note 80, at 534 (citing EUGEN ULMER, URHEBER-UND
VERLAGSRECHT, at 210, 218 (6th ed. 1987).
251
See id. (citing ULMER, supra note 250, at 216). See also Strömholm II, supra note
5, at 60.
252
Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 60.
253
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 100. But when an entire scene is cut from an opera, a
court will award minimal compensation to the set designer. See Léger v. Réunion des
Théatres Lyriques Nationaux, Trib. civ. de la Seine, Oct. 15, 1954, RIDA No. VI, 146
(1955).
254
See FRG, supra note 89, art. 83(1), (2) (“If a work is performed by a group of
performers, each one in the exercise of this right must take into account the legitimate
interests of the others.”).
255
See supra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
256
See Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 14.
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prevent the completion of the film.257 The “anarchic exercise” of
moral rights by individuals does not comport with the nature of a
film as a collaboration.258 German law also restrains the authors’
rights for motion pictures — they can protest only gross distortion
or injury to their work and must take the interests of other
contributors as well as of the producer into account.259 Thus,
Continental laws balance the interests of the parties involved when
determining a violation of the right to integrity for movies.
VI. SPECIAL PROTECTION OF VISUAL ART

A. United States Law

1. Visual Artists Rights Act
In spite of the widespread American opposition to moral rights,
in 1990 Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (hereinafter
“VARA”).260 VARA grants the right of attribution, the right of
integrity and a limited right to prevent destruction with respect to
works of “visual art.”261 The duration of these rights is limited to
the life of the author.262 Under VARA, “visual art” means a
painting, drawing, print or sculpture existing in at least one original
and at most two hundred signed and numbered copies.263 The
same applies to still photographs produced solely for the purpose
of exhibition.264 Numerous other works are excluded specifically
from VARA’s reach.265 VARA applies only to works 1) whose
257
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 102, citing the case of Prévert & Grimault, Cour cass.
civ., Apr. 13, 1959, D. 1959, 225.
258
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 104.
259
See FRG, supra note 89, art. 93.
260
Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1997)).
261
See id. § 106A(a).
262
See id. § 106A(d).
263
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1997).
264
See id.
265
See id. (“A work of visual art does not include — (A)(i) any poster, map, globe,
chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual
work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service,
electronic publication, or similar publication; (ii) any merchandising item or advertising,
promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container.”).
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title was not transferred prior to, or 2) that were created after, June
21, 1991, the date that VARA entered into force.266 Works that
were altered before VARA took effect are excluded from its
protections also.267
The rights provided by VARA exist independently of the
exclusive rights of Copyright Act Section 106.268 Not only does
VARA allow the author to assert the right “to claim authorship.”269
It also grants the author the right to “to prevent the use of his or her
name” on a work the author did not create270 or in the event of a
“distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation . . . .”271 The
Act does not provide a right to remain anonymous or use a
pseudonym.272
With regards to integrity, an author can personally prevent “any
intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of [the]
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation . . . .”273 He also has the right to prevent the destruction
of “a work of recognized stature” incorporated into a building,
whether or not the destruction injures the author’s honor or
reputation.274 These rights to prevent alteration or destruction are,
however, limited by Section 113(d) of the Copyright Act.275
Furthermore, destruction of a work must be intentional or grossly
266
See Visual Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, § 610 (declaring VARA
to become effective 6 months after passage). See also Waiver, supra note 130, at 112.
267
See id. See also Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the Ams. Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620, 626
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
268
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2)(1997).
269
Id. § 106A(a)(1)(A).
270
Id. § 106A(a)(1)(B).
271
Id. § 106A(a)(2).
272
See Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal
System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 947, 960
(1990).
273
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
274
Id. at §§ 106A(a)(3)(B), 113(d)(1).
275
See 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(B) (in the case of works that cannot be removed from a
building without violating the provisions regarding integrity and destruction, the author can
consent to a “violation” of the integrity right). Absent a signed, written consent, the
removal of works installed after the passage of VARA violates § 106(A)(a). See Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d and vacated in part and
aff’d in part by 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995). For works that can be removed without altering
or destroying the work, the owner of the building can remove the work if he made a
diligent, good faith effort to notify the author 90 days prior to the removal in order to allow
the author to remove or pay for the removal of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2).
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negligent to be actionable.276
The rights contained in VARA are personal to the author and
may not be transferred.277 The rights can, however, be waived by
the author in a signed, written instrument.278 The instrument must
specifically identify the work and the uses of that work that are to
be covered by the waiver.279 A mere transfer in ownership of the
work does not constitute a waiver of the author’s rights.280 Thus,
unless waived, the author’s VARA rights remain vested in the
work no matter how often ownership is transferred.
A broad limitation of the scope of the act results from the
exclusion of “works made for hire”. As with the copyright, the
rights rest with the employer.281
VARA generally adopts the remedies of the Copyright Act with
the exception of criminal penalties.282 Besides criminal claims, the
Copyright Act permits claims for injunctions,283 impoundment or
disposal of infringing articles,284 actual damages,285 lost profits,286
and costs and attorney’s fees.287
2. State Statutes
Ten American states have also passed moral rights legislation for
visual arts prior to the passage of VARA. These statutes can be
categorized into three models: the preservation model, the moral
rights model, and the public works model.288 All of the statutes
276

See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
See id. § 106A(a)(e)(1).
278
See id.
279
See id.
280
See id. § 106A(a)(e)(2).
281
See id. § 101.
282
See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
283
See id. § 502.
284
See id. § 503.
285
See id. § 504(a).
286
See id.
287
See id. § 505.
288
The preservation model protects an author’s rights of attribution and integrity and
prohibits the destruction of artistic works under certain circumstances. California,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have the preservation model. See Waiver,
supra note 130, at 11-14. In 1979, California enacted the first moral rights legislation in
the United States by passing the California Art Preservation Act to serve “the dual
purpose of protecting the artist’s reputation and of protecting the public interest in
277
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cover only fine art or “visual or graphic works.”289
VARA preempts state law causes of action based on a violation
of rights equivalent to those of VARA, if the violation occurred
after the passage of VARA.290 Works not covered by, and rights
not granted by VARA, “are not preempted, even when they relate
to works covered by [VARA,]”291 and the state laws remain
effective for violations committed before VARA went into effect.
Preemption determinations are made on a case-by-case basis.292
As one court stated, the preemption issue “will occupy courts for
years to come.”293
B. Continental Law
As in the United States, Continental law first applied the moral
right of integrity to works of visual art.294 The German decision of
Felseiland mit Sirenen (hereinafter “Sirenen”), decided in 1912,
ushered in the general acceptance of the right of integrity in
Europe.295 In Sirenen, a house owner altered a fresco that he had
commissioned from a painter. The court held this alteration to be a
violation of the right of integrity. But the court also indicated that it
preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations.” Id. at 12 (quoting 1 JOHN
HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 163
(1987). The statutes in the other three states are similar to that of California. Id. at 1214. Under each statute, the artist has a limited right to prevent destruction of his work.
Id.
The moral rights model protects an author’s rights of attribution and integrity to
varying degrees. Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island follow this
model. Id. at 14-16.
Finally, the public works model gives limited attribution and integrity rights for
works displayed in public buildings. New Mexico’s Art in Public Buildings Act is one
such example of this model. Id. at 16-17.
289
See id. at 11-16.
290
See 17 U.S.C. § 301(f) (1997).
291
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 21 (1990).
292
See id. The lack of case law for VARA makes the determination of what rights are
preempted by it all the more difficult. Id. The Final Report of the Register of Copyrights
expects that a number of state laws will remain effective since they confer rights not
covered by VARA. Id. For example, rights of integrity that do not require a showing of
“prejudice to honor or reputation” will likely not be preempted. Id.
293
Pavia, 901 F. Supp. at 626 (quoting Charles Ossola, Law for Art’s Sake, THE
RECORDER, Jan. 8, 1991, at 6).
294
See supra notes 260-87 and accompanying text (discussing VARA).
295
See Felseiland mit Sirenen, RG (8.6.1912), RGZ 79, 397. See also DIETZ, supra
note 15, at 112. The sphere of influence of this opinion encompassed France. See id. at
note 284.
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would have allowed the alteration to stand if no chance existed that
the work would be seen by the public. Moreover, it held in dicta
that complete destruction of a work would not infringe an author’s
moral right.296 The German copyright law of 1965 adopted a
similar position on destruction, but the elastic nature of the
regulation indicates that an author can act against “willful”
destruction of his work.297 Owners might be required to inform the
artist of their intention to destroy the work and allow the author a
chance to remove it.298
French law also forbids the alteration of an original work of art
by an owner, although the interests of the owner will be taken into
account. Thus, when frescos are painted onto an owner’s private
property without the knowledge of the owner and he disapproves
of the work, he may have the right to remove or obliterate the work
without any notification to the artist.299 In general, however, an
owner cannot remove or alter an immovable artwork attached to
his premises without the consent of the author, especially if the
public has access to the work.300 But if the artwork is not created
for a specific location, it can be sold and removed without the
author’s permission.301 After a movable piece of art has been
made public, any mutilation will entitle the author to damages.302
But the author cannot demand a return of the work, and damages
might be minimal.303 Finally, the absolute destruction of a work of
art will not infringe the right of integrity, because the author’s
reputation will not be damaged by an exposure of his damaged

296

See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 111-12.
See id. at 112. Cf. supra note 276 and accompanying text.
298
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 112. Cf. supra note 275 and accompanying text.
299
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 113, citing Fresques de Juvisy, Trib. civ. de
Versailles, June 23, 1932, D.H. 1932, 487 & Paris, Apr. 27, 1934, D.H. 1934, 385. That
the defendant was a Catholic bishop might have swayed the court to be more lenient.
300
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 114 (citing Les Compagnons de l’Art mural). See
also Sudre v. Commune de Baixas, Conseil de Préfecture de Montpellier, Dec. 9, 1937,
G.P. 1937, 1, 347. Cf. supra note 275 and accompanying text.
301
See Baldaccini c. Ville de Lyon, Trib. civ. de Lyon, Apr. 28, 1997, RIDA No. 173,
373 (1997).
302
See Fersing v. Buffet, Cass. civ. 1re, July 6, 1965, J.C.P. 1965, 14339. Whether
the court held that the mutilation violated the right per se, or only that “the owner cannot
sell the work without respecting its integrity,” is not entirely clear in the decision.
303
In Buffet, the artist received one centime compensation, less than one U.S. cent,
though it must be added that he did not request more. Buffet, Cass. civ. 1re, July 6, 1965,
J.C.P. 1965, 14339.
297
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work to the public or third persons.304
VII. THE RIGHT TO RETRACT

A. United States Law
The Copyright Act grants a limited right of retraction by
allowing the author the right to void a contract without cause after
thirty-five years.305 And under contract law, the author could
refuse to transfer the work prior to publication. A court might or
might not award specific performance — it would depend on the
facts of the case.306
B. Continental Law
Both French and German law allow an author limited rights to
refuse to deliver a work prior to, or to retract a work after,
publication. But the publisher has rights to recoup any losses that
the author incurs by his retraction.307
304
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 111. Such a conclusion can also be drawn from
Buffet, depending how one interprets the decision. See supra text accompanying note
302.
305
See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1997).
306
Courts are loathe to enforce specific performance against a party’s will when the
party has a strong personal interest in the object of the contract. The law is reluctant to
deprive an author of his work against his will in almost all cases; only a voluntary
bankruptcy will justify a taking of the property. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e). Similar
considerations might prove persuasive in this context as well. For example, should the
court refuse to order specific performance, the author would be required to pay damages.
307
In France, the author enjoys an unlimited right to retract, provided that he
compensates third parties for their incurred losses. The author must also offer the work
to the original user under the original conditions should he decide to publish the work at a
later date. 1 Strömholm III, supra note 30, at 539.
Germany has two provisions: one that applies only to publishing contracts, and one
of general application. The general provision allows an author to revoke a license
provided that he compensates the licensee in advance for the costs incurred prior to
revocation. But it requires the author to demonstrate that the work no longer represents
his opinion so that he can “no longer be expected to agree to the exploitation of the
work.” FRG, supra note 89, art. 42. The right cannot be waived and can be invoked by
the author’s testamentary successor, provided the author was prevented from invoking the
right during her lifetime. Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 65. The specific publishing
provision grants the right to retract up until the beginning of reproduction, should
unforeseeable events occur that would have prevented a reasonable author from entering
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VIII. COMPATIBILITY OF MORAL RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW

A. Limited Practical Application of Continental Moral Rights
An examination of the manner in which France and Germany
apply moral rights demonstrates that moral rights are not
inherently anathema to American law. The absoluteness of moral
rights and their “overbearing potential” are limited by the public
interest: “copyright in a capitalist economy must place the greatest
importance on the transferability and usefulness of the work.”308
The Continental systems balance the “moral” interests of the
author with the interests of publishers and the public to achieve
results that do not differ greatly from American enforcement of
“moral rights.” Ergo, individual moral rights are essentially
compatible with the basic principles of American copyright law.
B. Public Rights: Exceptions to Moral Rights
An examination of the exceptions to moral rights that French
and German law allow further demonstrates that moral rights are
limited by the public interest and compatible with American
copyright law.
1. Private Use
In both France and Germany, members of the public have the
absolute right to use the work as they wish in private. Moral rights
protection vests only when a person makes a public use of the
work.309
a publishing contract. The author still must compensate the publisher for all expenses
and is liable for damages if he publishes the same manuscript elsewhere within a year. Id
at 64.
308
H. HUBMANN, URHEBER-UND VERLAGSRECHT 27 (6th ed. 1987) (“Das
Urheberrecht in einer kapitalistischen Wirtschaft muß daher vor allem der
Verkehrsfähigkeit und Nutzbarkeit des Werkes Rechnung tragen”).
309
Only in cases of private use does the French law make an explicit exception
allowing a work to be used without attribution. Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O.,
Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 41(1) & (2). Private alteration of works is also permitted,
unless the altered work is made public or altered for purposes of publication. Id.; DIETZ,
supra note 15, at 110. German law provides that authorship does not have to be
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2. Fair Use

a. Attribution
Berne requires that fair uses of a work give credit to the
source.310 Both French and German law require that any public
use of the author’s work give credit to the author.311 American law
makes no such requirement for fair use. But fair-use practice
usually respects the right. Any substantial unauthorized use under
whatever attribution would usually violate the copyright in the
work.312 A public use of the author’s work with a false attribution
would usually constitute reverse passing off.313
b. Integrity
With respect to the right of integrity, French law provides a
number of fair-use exceptions. A work can be analyzed and
quoted in various forms of abridgement such as criticism, review,
academic presentations, as well as parody.314
The German law’s chapter making exceptions to copyright
provides that fair uses under copyright must respect the right of
integrity; however, mere extracts, as well as necessary, good faith
alterations are permitted.315

acknowledged in cases of private use, free public presentations, and in a limited number
of other cases. FRG, supra note 89, art. 63; DIETZ, supra note 15, at 121-22. The law
also allows alterations for personal use, except when the altered work is actually or
intended to be displayed publicly. DIETZ, supra note 15, at 110, 92-94. Altered original
works of art must be kept absolutely private. See supra notes 295-296 and accompanying
text.
310
See Berne, supra note 21, at arts. 10(3), 10bis(1).
311
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
312
See supra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
313
See supra notes 115-42 and accompanying text.
314
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 110, 92-94; Société Microfor v. Le Monde, Cass. ass.
plén., Oct. 30, 1987, J.O. No. 8, October 1987, (“Chambres Civiles”) 7.
315
See FRG, supra note 89, art. 62(1), (2).
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C. Waiver
Berne does not expressly allow or prohibit waivers of moral
rights.316 “[O]n the whole, [it] hardly touches on the law of
contracts.”317 Thus, there is wide variation between Berne member
states regarding waivers.318 While many states prohibit any waiver
of moral rights, a number of countries have no specific
provisions.319 Only Canada allows moral rights to be waived in
whole or in part, while the United Kingdom allows specific
waivers.320 Moreover, a number of countries, including France and
Germany, allow limited implied waivers to the rights of attribution
and integrity.321
In American law, VARA allows a waiver, but it must be specific
and in writing.322 For all other works, a licensing agreement or
transfer of the copyright can act as an implied waiver of the rights
of attribution and integrity, but the contractee must execute the
contract in good faith and give reasonable respect to the name,
reputation, and work of the author.323 An express waiver will be
enforced.324
D. Works-Made-for-Hire
France and Germany do not generally apply the work-made-forhire doctrine to moral rights. Only for computer programs created
in the scope of employment does the work-made-for-hire doctrine
apply categorically.325 But the laws do allow a number of specific
exceptions to moral rights for works-made-for-hire.
For example, the moral rights of the employee are waived in
favor of the employer in certain circumstances. In France, moral
316

See Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis. See also Waiver, supra note 130, at 52.
NORDEMANN, supra note 100, at 87.
318
See Waiver, supra note 130, at 26-56.
319
See id. France, for example, prohibits waivers. Id.
320
See id. at 33-35, 47-51.
321
See id. at 54. See supra notes 148, 161, 165, 230-59 and accompanying text.
322
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
323
See supra notes 115-142, 179-224 and accompanying text.
324
See supra notes 142, 198-203 and accompanying text.
325
See Council Directive No. 91/250, art. 2, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42. Under Article 2 of
the directive, the employer is considered the author and thus possesses all rights to the
work.
317
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rights automatically belong to the employer for many works made
for hire.326 In Germany, the employer can reserve some moral
rights for the work by contract. And in some instances, German
law implies the consent of the employee to a waiver.327 Works
prepared in the normal course of business for the normal business
purposes of the employer are treated like works-made-for-hire in
the United States.328 And for motion pictures, German law deems
the primary authors “to have granted to the producer the exclusive
right to utilize” the work “in every known manner” and they can
protest only gross distortions of their contributions.329
In the United States, the work-made-for-hire doctrine acts as an
automatic waiver of the copyright, the VARA rights and most of
the “moral rights” equivalents.330 The employer is considered the
author and thus possesses all of the author’s rights.331 Berne does
not prohibit the application of the work-made-for-hire doctrine.
Before the French copyright law of 1957, French courts applied the
work-made-for-hire doctrine in a similar fashion to its application
326
An express contractual transfer of copyright ownership from employee to
employer is legitimate. STROWEL, supra note 80, at 325-27. A transfer can be implied
when the work is performed in the scope of employment and is related directly to the
employer’s business purpose. Id. at 326. And a contractual provision that the copyright
for all works created by the employee is transferred to the employer can be valid as long
as it is restricted to works foreseeable in the course of employment. Bossard v. Rénault,
Cass. civ. 1re, Feb. 4, 1986, 1986 Bull. Civ. I, No. 12; STROWEL, supra note 80, at 327-28
(citing Cour de Lyon, Nov. 28, 1991, G.P., Apr. 15-16, 1992, 34). A contract without
such a restriction might be valid, but runs the risk of being invalidated as a “global
transfer” of the rights, which is forbidden by Article 33 of the French law. Id. at 328.
Moreover, the French provisions on collective works provide that the “natural or
legal person” under whose name a work appears is the owner of all the author’s rights.
Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 13 (“L’oeuvre
collective est, sauf preuve contraire, la propriete de la personne physique ou morale sous
le nom de laquelle elle est divulguee.”). Provided that that person is responsible for the
creation of the work, exercises a strong degree of control over its creation, and it is
impossible to distinguish and attribute the individual contributions. Id. at art. 9. These
are comparable to the factors American courts consider to determine if a work is made
for hire. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
327
See supra notes 148, 161 and accompanying text.
328
See FRG, supra note 89, art. 43. Some commentators believe that this can occur
only under an express contract clause, but courts have held that a transfer is implied by
the employment contract. STROWEL, supra note 80, at 359.
329
FRG, supra note 89, arts. 89. See also id. art. 93.
330
See supra note 288 and accompanying text. See also Poe, 151 F. Supp. at 801.
Because some of the equivalent rights are personal to the author, uses of a work that
prejudice the author’s honor or reputation or which somehow pose unfair competition —
which is unlikely but possible in an employment relationship — would remain
actionable.
331
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1997).
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in the United States.332
E. Transfer
Berne determines that the “author shall have” the rights of
attribution and integrity “[i]ndependently of the author’s economic
rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights . . . .”333 The
German law follows this principle inherently, by providing that
none of the rights to a work is ever really transferred.334 The
French law provides that the moral rights are “inalienable and
imprescriptible.”335 The American VARA also provides that the
moral rights cannot be transferred.336
American law contains no provision regarding the transfer of
moral rights for non-VARA works. Before the property is
transferred, the rights remain with the author. After the transfer of
the copyright, the owner of the copyright owns the aspects of the
rights covered by copyright law. The author maintains the rights
of action outside of copyright law, unless an express or implied
waiver applies.
F. Duration
French and German law provide different periods of duration for
moral rights. German law provides equal duration of seventy years
after the death of the author for both moral rights and the
copyright.337
France provides that the moral rights are
338
perpetual.
Upon the author’s death the rights pass to the heirs or
can be transferred to another by will.339 The French government
also has a right to make a post-mortem claim.340 Besides France,
332

See DaSilva, supra note 143, at 28-29 n.195 and accompanying text.
Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis(1).
334
See FRG, supra note 89, art. 29. The Germans employ a compulsory licensing
system to achieve what other copyright laws achieve by transfer or license after the fact.
335
Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 6 (“Ce droit
est . . . inalienable et imprescriptible.”).
336
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
337
See FRG, supra note 89, art. 64.
338
See Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 6.
339
See id.
340
See Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 20. See
also ADOLF DIETZ, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 185 (1978)
333
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the only European Union states granting perpetual moral rights
protection are Denmark, Italy and Portugal.341 Although these
perpetuity provisions aim to confirm the supremacy of moral
rights,342 the ultimate concern behind them is “safeguarding . . . the
national cultural heritage in the public interest.”343 In his study on
the possible harmonization of European copyright law, Professor
Dietz concluded that a perpetual moral right “should be rejected as
a copyright solution. The questions involved ought to be dealt
with outside the field of copyright and within the framework of
a . . . protection of ancient monuments.”344
Few countries provide that moral rights are perpetual.345 Article
6bis of Berne does not prescribe that moral rights are perpetual.
No international consensus ever emerged to make moral rights
protection in Berne perpetual. Article 6bis states only that they
must last as long as the copyright. And it allows the rights to
expire at the death of the author if the national law was such at the
time of “ratification or accession.”346
Moreover, notwithstanding the theoretical perpetuity of moral
rights, French courts have shown a reluctance to enforce them after
the expiration of the copyright. In 1997, the Cour de Cassation
rejected an appeal by the attorney-general of the Paris Court of
Appeals and held that a painter who copied the work and signature
of the nineteenth century artist, Toulouse-Lautrec, for sale did not
violate Toulouse-Lautrec’s moral rights by copying the
signature.347 In cases where unaffiliated parties brought suit to
(hereinafter “EUROPEAN COMMUNITY”). See infra note 347 and accompanying text.
341
See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EUROPE 101-07, 147-55, 269-76, 355-59
(George Metaxas-Maranghidis ed., 1995). See also EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note
340, at 181-83. All other member states provide that the rights expire at the death of the
author or with the economic rights. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EUROPE, at 41-51;
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 340, at 183-184.
342
See supra notes 353-57 and accompanying text.
343
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 340, at 183.
344
Id. at 188-89.
345
See Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 94. Of those countries having perpetual
protection, most are in Latin America or traditionally within the French sphere of
influence.
346
Ratification or accession could occur when a state either joins Berne or a state
already party to Berne ratifies any of the Rome, Brussels, Stockholm or Paris Acts
amending Berne. This grandfather clause was a concession to Common Law states
during the negotiations over the inclusion of Article 6bis in Berne. STROWEL, supra note
80, at 509.
347
See Le Procureur Général près la Cour d’Appel de Paris v. Sxxxx, Cass. crim.,
June 11, 1997, No. 96-80.388, (Lexis, France Library, Prive file, Biblio). It was no
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protect a work after it had fallen into the public domain, the suits
were dismissed for lack of standing because the consumers
suffered no direct injury.348
In the United States, the rights enforceable under the Copyright
Act last as long as the copyright: seventy years after the death of
the author.349 Only a few of the non-copyright causes of action
available to American authors expire at death.350 But a suit for
unfair competition under common law or Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act could be brought at any time when anyone attempted
to pass off goods that would confuse the public and would affect a
concrete interest of “any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged . . . .”351 This standard is roughly similar to
that employed by the Cour de Cassation for works in the public
domain.352
G. Supremacy of Moral Rights in Theory
Both French and German law rank the author’s “moral” interests
above his “economic” interests. The overriding objective of the
French and German copyright laws is to enforce the author’s moral
rights. Thus, German law provides that a work is inalienable —
copyright to a work can only be licensed, not transferred.353 And
when interpreting the law, German courts must take into account
the consideration that the author’s moral interests predominate.354
The “primacy of moral rights” under French law manifests itself
in three ways: (i) special rules of contract that favor the author in
relation to publishers; (ii) the restriction on the property rights of
publishers and the public in favor of the author; and, (iii) the
exclusion of unpublished works from marital property and the right
violation to copy the signature of a painter whose work had fallen into the public domain
because there was no risk of confusion where “copie” was stamped on the back and the
format of the canvases differed.
348
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 106-07 (although one of the suits involved one of the
most prized books in French literature, “les Misérables,” by Victor Hugo).
349
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1999).
350
For example, all the rights under tort law would expire.
351
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
352
Cf. supra note 348 and accompanying text.
353
See FRG, supra note 89, art. 29.
354
See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 38-39 (citing the official government report on the
passage of the law, Amtliche Begründung, at 29, right column).
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of authors to maintain control of the moral rights during and after
marriage.355
Unlike French and German law, however, Berne fortunately
does not require or infer that a member state grant supremacy to
moral rights. Such a condition would directly contradict the stated
objective of the United States Constitution that copyright is
protected in the public interest. Still, American law (i) provides
special rules of contract that favor an author, (ii) restricts the
property rights of others to an author’s work, and (iii) favors
unpublished works over other forms of property.356 Thus,
American law grants special rights similar in principle to
Continental law that confirm that “the individual author is the
fountainhead of copyright.”357
IX. THE UNITED STATES’ INTEREST IN IMPLEMENTING MORAL
RIGHTS

A. Compliance with the Berne Convention
American law provides significant protections to the interests
safeguarded by Berne’s rights of attribution and integrity. There
are some considerations, however, that lead to the conclusion that
equivalent rights in the United States do not comply with the letter

355

See STROWEL, supra note 80, at 495.
The Copyright Act’s provision on transfer prevents any governmental entity from
seizing a copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1997) (“When an individual author’s ownership
of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights . . . has not previously been
transferred . . .”). The restriction does not apply to the proceeds from the copyright. See
BALL, supra note 197, at 61. This provision was passed to “reaffirm the basic principle
that the individual author is the fountainhead of copyright, and that his copyright cannot
be taken away from him involuntarily.” Second Supplementary Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, ch. I at 8-9; ch. XII at 89 (drafted. 1975). “The purpose of this subsection is to reaffirm the basic principle that
the United States copyright of an individual author shall be secured to that author, and
cannot be taken away by any involuntary transfer.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976),
reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 960. The Senate report also supports this position. 1 PATRY,
supra note 17, at 144. Only a voluntary declaration of bankruptcy allows an
“involuntary” transfer. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, reprinted in 17
U.S.C. at 960. Moreover, most of the equivalent rights are enforceable independently
during and after a marriage.
357
See Second Supplementary Report, supra note 356, ch. I at 8-9; ch. XII at 8-9.
356
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of Berne, nor with the object and purpose of Article 6bis.358
The major contradiction between American law and Berne is
that the author has no legally recognizable, enforceable moral
rights — American law does not recognize moral rights. As a
result, there is a considerable possibility that an author attempting
to protect his interests in attribution and integrity will be denied a
cause of action. Berne requires that authors “shall have” the rights
of attribution and integrity. Although Berne allows member states
the choice of how to “safeguard” the rights, it does not allow them
not to recognize these rights.359 How can one safeguard rights that
do not exist? If there is no recognized right, there is no recognized
remedy.
American law grants an author a number of possible causes of
action that equate to moral rights. But the author has no express
rights of attribution and integrity under statutory or common
law.360 Furthermore, the author carries the burden of securing his
own moral rights — it is up to him to prove that he even has an
alternative right before he can seek a vindication of his “moral
rights.”
Article 6bis provides an author clear and enforceable rights of
attribution and integrity. In order to prevent these rights from
being directly enforceable, however, Congress stated expressly in
the Berne Convention Implementation Act (hereinafter “BCIA”)
that Berne was non-self-executing.361 Furthermore, both the BCIA
and Berne became effective on March 1, 1989.362 The confluence
of the effective dates for Berne and the BCIA ensured that the
later-in-time rule would not cause the treaty to override the
358

See NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.02(D)(1) (U.S. moral rights protection
“apparently fails to accord the full-fledged protection contemplated by Article 6bis”).
359
Prior to the U.S. accession to Berne, a congressional delegation met in Europe with
international copyright experts. These experts assured the U.S., “it is not necessary for
the [U.S.] to enact statutory provisions on moral rights in order to comply with Article
6bis [of Berne]. These requirements can be fulfilled . . . also by the common law and
other statutes.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990). These experts did not pass judgment,
however, on whether American equivalent rights actually complied with the convention.
360
With the exception of the VARA rights. See supra notes 261 and accompanying
text.
361
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (“BCIA”), Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853, § 2(1) (1988) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 116, 116A, 205, 301, 401-408,
411, 501, 504, 801 (1997)). One third of the BCIA seeks to ensure that the treaty remains
non-self-executing. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 1.12(A).
362
See BCIA, supra note 361, § 13(a).
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BCIA.363 The greatest motivation behind these provisions was to
prevent a direct application of moral rights in American courts.364
Thereby, Congress clearly indicated its intent to avoid
implementation of moral rights.
This lack of legislative
recognition of moral rights has been influential in courts denying
relief for moral rights infringement.365
In addition, currently available causes of action and their
likelihood of success are difficult to assess. Some causes of action
are under copyright law, some are not.366 Some of the potential
claims arise under federal law, some under state law.367 Some
arise under common law, some under statutory law.368 All this
requires courts to look at the same issues from a potentially wide
array of legal perspectives. For those claims arising under federal
law, a plaintiff has recourse to a federal court.369 Should federal
claims in a case be dismissed, the federal court will no longer have
jurisdiction and the plaintiff will have to reinitiate the case in state
court. As aliens, however, foreign authors would still have
recourse to federal court, which would then be required to hear
state law claims in a federal forum.370 All of these considerations
place a significant burden on the plaintiff, the defendant, and the
administration of justice.
A further complicating factor is the effect a transfer of copyright
has on the moral rights. Berne requires that the moral rights exist
independently of the copyright.371 Moral rights can be waived
expressly and certain limited waivers can be implied.372 But the
possibility that an author might not be allowed to pursue a right of
attribution and integrity simply because he transferred his
copyright violates Berne’s requirement that these rights be
363

See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 28 (1988). This raises the question of why Congress
would go to such tactical trouble to circumvent the later-in-time rule. The later-in-time
rule would only be determinative if Berne were in actuality self-executing in spite of the
conclusions of the President and the Congress that it is not.
364
See NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 1.12(A).
365
See Paramount Pictures v. Video Broad. Sys., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 808, 819 (D. Kan.
1989). See also Dana L. Burton, Comment, Artists’ Moral Rights: Controversy and the
Visual Artists Rights Act, 48 SMU L. REV. 639, 646 (1995).
366
See supra notes 103-293 and accompanying text.
367
See id.
368
See id.
369
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
370
See id.
371
See Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis(1).
372
See supra notes 316-23 and accompanying text.
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independent of each other.373 It also contradicts the Copyright
Act’s rule empowering the author to determine which rights to
transfer in an assignment of copyright.374
Additionally, the effectiveness and interpretation of the
equivalent rights vary from court to court. With regard to the right
of attribution, for example, the Second and Ninth Circuits — the
most important circuits for copyright law — apply different
standards under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, albeit with
similar results.375 Whether a complete omission of an author’s
name violates the right of attribution will depend on the court. 376
373
The right of attribution is generally protected in spite of a copyright transfer,
except in cases of express waiver. However, there is no express rule, thus clouding the
issue and making a result less certain. And the right to integrity is subject to a transfer
under certain circumstances.
374
See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (a), (d).
375
The Second Circuit applies the “substantial similarity” standard of the Copyright
Act to determine when a misattribution occurs. Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc.,
43 F.3d 775, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1994). “[C]opying is generally established by showing (a)
that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and (b) the substantial similarity of
protectible material in the two works.” Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 662 (2d
Cir. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1112 (1994). A misattribution occurs if a work is
substantially similar to the author’s original work and does not credit the author. See
Waldman, 43 F.3d at 782-83.
The Ninth Circuit applies a “bodily appropriation” standard. Cleary v. News
Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has held that a mere
substantial similarity between works is insufficient to create the requisite consumer
confusion that is the crux of a Lanham Act inquiry. Id. Thus, a work must “‘use . . .
substantially the entire’” contents of the author’s work for a misattribution to be
actionable. Id. (citing Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th
Cir. 1989)). Unfortunately, the Court did not clarify the distinction between substantial
similarity and a substantial use of the entire content of a work. In its opinion, the Court
stated that “slight modifications of a product might cause customer confusion, while
products which are merely generally similar will not.” Id. at 1261. This finding
conforms to the requirement of substantial similarity that only substantial, not general,
similarities between works pose a violation of an author’s right. The Supreme Court
applied the bodily appropriation standard in INS v. Associated Press, but stated that the
“rewriting” of an article would satisfy the standard, which also resembles the test for
substantial similarity. 248 U.S. 215, 243 (1918) (“bodily appropriation . . . with or
without rewriting”). Finally, in Cleary, the Ninth Circuit gave great weight to a case
involving a patentable lathe. 30 F.3d at 1261 (citing Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v.
Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993)). Because of the inherent
differences between patentable and copyrightable works, the standards for one cannot be
applied directly to the other. Patent and copyright law are similar: they are both forms of
intellectual property and are protected by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. But
the “Constitution differentiates ‘authors’ and their ‘writings’ from ‘inventors’ and their
‘discoveries.’” Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc),
cert. denied 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
376
The holding in Smith v. Montoro applies concretely only to cases of misattribution.
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For the right of integrity, only the First Circuit has held that
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects the integrity of the work.
No other circuit has ruled on the question. How federal and state
courts would rule under common law unfair competition is also
uncertain, given the sparse precedent on the issue. Moreover,
courts require varying degrees of proof for finding consumer
confusion in Section 43(a) and common law unfair competition
cases.377
Finally, the results of potential tort claims are also uncertain.
Even a less well-known artist can qualify as a public figure.378
Thus, a showing of malice might be required for a claim of
defamation.379 In addition, the usefulness of an invasion of privacy
claim is also limited.380
Amidst this potential confusion a plaintiff quite possibly will be
denied a cause of action for a violation of his rights of attribution
or integrity. A denial of a right will not violate Berne if the
plaintiff is an American.381 But a failure to vindicate a right of
648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981). The Smith v. Montoro court’s discussion of reverse
passing off indicates that it would make no distinction between a work marked falsely
and one not marked at all. See id. at 605-06. Subsequent decisions support this opinion.
See, e.g., Waldman, 43 F.3d at 782 (“It would constitute a false designation of origin to
publish without attribution to its author a work that is original enough to deserve
copyright protection.”); Cleary, 30 F.3d at 1261 (“‘Implied’ reverse passing off occurs
when the wrongdoer simply removes or otherwise obliterates the name of the . . . source”
and sells the product). Although this is the most reasonable conclusion under the
Lanham Act, it is not the only conclusion. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.03(A)(2).
377
Two Southern District of New York decisions made within ten months of each
other demonstrate the difficulty caused by courts’ variation. In Geisel, the court required
“proof of injury to plaintiff or of actual deception of a portion of the buying public” and
denied the claim. 295 F. Supp. at 353. In Yameta, the court found a demonstration of a
“likelihood of consumer deception” sufficient to grant relief. 279 F. Supp. at 587. Other
courts have denied a right absent proof of actual confusion. Apple Corps Ltd. v.
A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342, 346 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
378
See Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 148 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
379
See Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 148. Knowledge of the statement’s falsity or a
reckless disregard as to the truth of the statement qualifies as malice. See New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
380
In some states the rights are statutory while in others they derive from the common
law. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254. Not all states recognize all of these torts.
SCHECHTER, supra note 125, at 125. A false light claim is probably helpful only to wellknown authors. Ross, supra note 173, at 377. Depending on the circumstances, wellknown authors would therefore be limited to unflattering exposure claims. Success under
a “public disclosure of private facts” theory only guarantees that the author’s involvement
be described truthfully, not that his name be deleted. Zim, 573 F.2d at 1324.
381
See supra note 34.
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attribution or integrity will violate the treaty if the work first
appeared in another Berne member-state. Whether or not Article
6bis is self-executing, the United States has agreed to enforce it
and a failure to do so violates its obligations under Berne.
B. Ease of Implementation
The ease with which moral rights could be implemented is
another reason for the United States to implement moral rights.
Although the American equivalent rights have significant potential
gaps, their underlying principle is the same as that which underlies
Article 6bis — an author has interests in attribution and integrity
and the right to prevent an unreasonable use of his work. These
equivalent rights provide tangible and significant protection for the
rights of attribution and integrity.
A close examination of the means by which France and
Germany regulate moral rights also supports the conclusion that
American implementation of moral rights would hardly disturb the
current state of American law. Though the rights are framed in
broad terms, France and Germany place limits on the author’s
exercise of moral rights. Continental law also essentially prevents
those uses that are unreasonable.382
Implementation of moral rights in America will not affect the
current limits that the law currently places on the author’s interests
in attribution and integrity. For example, the work-made-for-hire
doctrine will remain intact; which is particularly meaningful for
the motion picture industry, traditionally one of the staunchest
opponents of moral rights.383 In addition, the industry will not be
required to adopt the Continental policy of designating the director
as the primary copyright holder, nor will it have to grant significant
new rights to directors, actors, authors, etc.384 Many of these rights

382

The definition of reasonableness will differ somewhat from country to country and
from system to system. But such distinctions go to the enforcement, and not the
recognition, of moral rights.
383
See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 22, at 176, 184.
384
This is exemplified by the new European Union directive on copyright law that
grants producers the right to control the publication of a motion picture, although authors,
actors, and directors are the primary rights holders under the laws of most E.U. member
states. See Council Directive 01/29, art. 3 (c), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16.
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are already guaranteed contractually,385 or statutorily by the
California Business and Professions Code.386
Furthermore, moral rights will remain subject to contract law.387
Express waivers of moral rights will still be enforceable.388
Waivers can be implied when such an implication would be
reasonable under the circumstances.389 As with VARA and as
required by Berne, the law will have to ensure the independence of
the moral rights from the copyright, but such a provision will not
change the current state of American law dramatically.390
With regard to damages and duration, the United States can still
limit damages for non-economic injuries or for non-commercial
uses of a work by a defendant.391 In addition, the United States
will not be required to implement perpetual moral rights;392 only a

385

For example, by the recent agreement between the Writers Guild of America and
motion picture and television producers that guarantees extensive attribution rights to
authors. See WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, III. GUILD POLICY
ON CREDITS (2001), available at http://wga.org/credits/Manual/screen3.html (last visited
Aug. 2, 2001).
386
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
387
The only limitation is that they remain independent of the copyright.
388
See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
389
See supra notes 316-23 and accompanying text.
390
Many of the equivalent rights are already independent of a copyright transfer. The
right of attribution is usually protected absent an express waiver. The largest impact
would be on the right to integrity, where certain causes of action are currently subject to a
transfer of copyright. However, absent a waiver, providing for the independence of
moral rights and copyright will only require publishers not to make unreasonable changes
to a work. Good faith changes required by the medium of exploitation will still be
allowed.
391
These issues go to the redress of the moral rights, not their recognition. See, e.g.,
Merchant v. Lymon, 828 F. Supp. 1048, 1059-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding no right to
recover absent an economic loss). French law, for example, also limits recovery for injuries
whose economic impact is minimal. Supra note 152 and accompanying text. But where
marketability depends on reputation, being credited with a work constitutes a protectible
interest reasonably subject to legal protection. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.03(A)(4).
“Commercial injury” implies that the violation occurs “in connection with the sale
of goods or services . . . .” Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 142. Under current law, a
plaintiff will only have standing under Section 43(a) if he can show a “potential for a
commercial or competitive injury.” Berni v. International Gourmet Rests. of Am., 838 F.2d
642, 648 (2d Cir. 1988). In F.E.L. Publ’ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, Catholic
churches in Chicago copied hymns without the permission of the copyright owners. 506
F. Supp. 1127, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 859, appeal dismissed, 739
F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1984), reh’g, 754 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1985). The court found no
violation of § 43(a) because the copies did not enter into commerce. Id.
392
See supra notes 337-52 and accompanying text.
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minority of countries grant perpetual protection to moral rights.393
Once the United States incorporates the protection of the
author’s interests of attribution and integrity into the Copyright
Act, all of the moral rights recognized by the French and German
copyright laws will be included in the American statute.394 The
Congress and the courts have followed an expansive policy for
copyright law since the first law was implemented in 1790.
Congress has always adopted the policy of including all possible
exclusive rights related to copyright law in the Copyright Act.
Adding rights of attribution and integrity to the author’s rights of
the Act would place all of the author’s basic interests currently
recognized within or without of copyright law under the Copyright
Act’s jurisdiction.
C. Equal Treatment for American Authors in America
Recognizing moral rights will also benefit American authors.
Foreign authors already have some greater rights than Americans
under the Copyright Act.395 And Berne places obligations on
American courts to enforce moral rights for foreigners. American
courts must enforce foreigners’ moral rights or the United States
will be in breach of the treaty. A foreign author can walk into an
American court and demand moral rights protection — a failure to
recognize this protection would violate the Convention in spite of
Article 6bis being non-self-executing.396
Thus, American authors have less protection in the United States
than foreign authors do. This seems odd given that the reason the
United States increased the rights of foreigners and joined Berne
was to increase the rights of American authors.397 The adoption of
moral rights will finally “secure the highest available level of
international copyright protection of American artists, authors, and
393

See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
The rights to publish and retract are already statutorily protected. Supra notes 3034 and accompanying text.
395
For example, in 1994 the U.S. resurrected copyright protection for foreign works
that had been in the public domain, but had been published within the past seventy-five
years. No such resurrection occurred for works of American origin. NIMMER, supra note
2, at § 9.01.
396
Even if Article 6bis is not self-executing under American law, the obligation to
adhere to the treaty remains.
397
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
394
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copyright holders” at home and abroad.398
D. Future Challenges to Copyright Protection
Computers and the Internet are creating a parallel, metaphysical
world with no legal, physical, territorial, or cultural boundaries.399
This progress provides limitless possibilities for violations of
copyright and moral rights. Violations of copyright and the right
to publish have already occurred.400 A violation of the author’s
rights can occur before the author or transferee even has an
opportunity to publish the work in its original, physical form.401
The piracy of software on the Internet is a serious problem that
costs authors millions of dollars a year.402 And music piracy has
exploded causing tremendous controversy in the music industry
and becoming a matter of intense litigation.403 The potential piracy
of other works is impossible to gauge.
The potential threat to an author’s “moral rights” has also
increased significantly. Modern technology has transcended
fixation. Fixation has always been an inherent quality of
copyrightable expression: a work cannot generally be perceived
and marketed if it is not fixed, i.e., if it does not have physical
form.404 But computer technology has freed expression from form.
The author’s expression is no longer trapped and tangible; it is
fluid and malleable in cyber-space. These changes make it
possible for anyone — not just publishers — to reproduce a work
398

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See Janet Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 890 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
400
See, e.g., Doreen Carvajal, Children’s Book Casts a Spell Over Adults, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at B1; Neil Strauss, Expert to Help Devise Format for Delivering
Music on Net, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at C1; Jon Pareles, Trying to Get in Tune with
the Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1999, at C1.
401
For example, the availability on the Internet of “American Pie 2” before its release.
See Bernard Warner, Why Pay to See ‘American Pie 2’ When It’s Free Online, REUTERS,
Aug. 2, 2001 available at www.reuters.com (last visited Aug. 2, 2001). Another example
is that the biography of François Mitterrand appeared on the Internet during publication
and distribution of the actual book.
402
See Paul Taylor, Software Pirates Boom on the Internet: Intellectual Property
Businesses May Be Losing $1 Billion a Year Through Illegal Copying, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
2, 1999, at 6.
403
For example, the ongoing controversy and litigation over napster.com.
404
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1997) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . .”).
399
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with a false attribution or without any attribution. Additionally,
these changes greatly simplify the ability to cut and paste a work
thereby increasing the potential for violations of the work’s
integrity.405 Finally, technological advancement makes possible
the creation of performances generated entirely by computer. This
threat is greatest for the motion picture industry and actors. It will
be possible to make an entire original film using an actor’s image,
voice, and artistic expressions without the consent of actors or
producers whose success is tied to the actors they employ.406
E. Interest in International Cooperation
The global nature of the Internet will make international
protection of works of authorship more important than ever.
International and national historical experiences have shown that
authors in one state are threatened by insufficient or non-existent
copyright protection in other states.407
Members of Berne recently addressed some of these concerns by
adopting the “Copyright Treaty.”408
The Copyright Treaty
provides that authors have the “exclusive right of authorizing any
communication to the public of their works” on the Internet or by
any other “wire or wireless means.”409 The treaty also grants
authors an exclusive right to distribute their works by “sale or
405

The “facile use of . . . scissors” is easier than ever before. Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at
344-45; see supra note 184 and accompanying text.
406
See Bernd Graff, Das Binäre im Auge des Feindes, SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, July
10, 2001 available at www.sueddeutsche.de (last visited Aug. 2, 2001) (describing the
technological capability to digitally copy actors’ faces, bodies and movements); Lisa
Guernsey, Software Called Capable of Copying Any Human Voice, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
2001 available at www.nyt.com (last visited Aug. 2, 2001). This development might
require a limited expansion of moral rights. Such a law would protect the author’s
physical expressions contained in his or her works, and would thus be compatible with
copyright law.
407
The Constitution included copyright among the federal powers to ensure efficient
national protection. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). The experiences in
nineteenth century Europe — particularly in the politically fractured Germany —
demonstrated the dangers of differing and inadequate levels of enforcement. JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 376-78 n.d (1896) (Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. &
John M. Gould eds.) (“The case of Germany shows how important it was [in the U.S.]
that the law of copyright should rest on the broad basis of federal jurisdiction.”).
408
See Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, preamble (“Recognizing the profound impact
of the development and convergence of information and communication technologies on
the creation and use of literary and artistic works . . . .”).
409
Id. art. 8. See also id. art. 4.
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other transfer of ownership.”410 It does not interfere with national
contract regulations after the first sale or transfer.411 The treaty
does not include a specific moral rights provision but stipulates
that all parties “shall comply with Articles 1 to 21” of Berne.412
Both the United States and the European Union have signed the
Copyright Treaty, which will go into effect as soon as thirty states
have acceded to it.413
The challenge remains, however, to extend effective copyright
regulation for all means of public communication to those nations
not guaranteeing sufficient enforcement. This includes bringing
those nations not party to Berne into the international copyright
community and improving enforcement in nations not providing
efficient enforcement.414
Similarly, American authors’ interests in attribution and integrity
will be violated abroad. These interests are protected by Berne. It
will be in the American interest to work for effective international
protection of moral rights and for increasing the global reach of
Berne. The greatest incentive for authors to create will be if all
their creative interests are protected worldwide. Additionally it
will provide the greatest profit to authors and their assigns and
ensure the greatest progress for science and the useful arts.
The current American stance on moral rights prevents the most
effective global protection of authors’ interests. The largest market
in the world provides no moral rights to American authors.
Foreign authors possess the right, but assessing the legal landscape
in order to determine a course of action is a near impossible task
for foreign authors. This hardship alone will likely cause
controversy. As well, the possibility that a foreign author will be
denied relief only increases the risk of confrontation. The lack of a
recognition of moral rights will make it more difficult to reach
agreement with other nations on international issues of copyright,
because it will cause them to question the sincerity of American
410

Id. art. 6(1).
See id. art. 6(2).
412
See id. art. 1(4).
413
See GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES IN FORCE: CURRENT TREATY ACTION
SUPPLEMENT (Igor I. Kavass ed., 2000).
414
For example, copyright enforcement in China. See Mark A. Groombridge, The
Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights Protection in the People’s Republic of
China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS, 11-46 (Clarisa Long
ed., 2000).
411
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efforts to provide the highest degree of international protection
possible to authors everywhere.
The United States is the last major Common Law copyright
system that has not implemented statutory moral rights or is not in
the process of doing so. Among the factors that convinced the
United States it could join Berne without implementing moral
rights was the lack of statutory moral rights protection in the
United Kingdom and Australia.415 But in 1988, the same year that
the United States acceded to Berne, the United Kingdom
implemented a new copyright act with moral rights provisions to
comply with Berne.416 And Australia implemented moral rights in
2000.417 Other important common law states have implemented
moral rights protections.418 Moreover, citing the lack of protection
in other states as a reason to refuse the implementation of moral
rights is not a legal argument, but a political one.419
The United States attempted to dampen the international impact
of moral rights in the TRIPs annex to the WTO convention.420
Article 9(1) of TRIPs provides that TRIPs incorporates Berne in its
entirety but for Article 6bis. Although TRIPs offers greater and
more effective protections of copyright than Berne, it will not
change any international obligations to enforce moral rights.421
More than 130 states are party to Berne, including all major
producers and consumers of copyrighted works.422 Unless all
member-states agree to abolish the treaty, it will remain important
for copyright law.
Even if TRIPs should push Berne aside as the prominent
copyright treaty, it will not push aside the issue of moral rights.
415

See Final Report, supra note 196, 548-49.
See Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, reprinted in 3 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT
LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1988).
417
See Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 (Austl.).
418
Canada implemented moral rights in 1985. Waiver, supra note 130, at 33-55.
India implemented moral rights in 1994. Shondeep Banerji, The Indian Intellectual
Property Rights Regime and the TRIPs Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN EMERGING MARKETS, supra note 414, at 51.
419
The United States would still be in violation of its legal obligations under Berne,
regardless of the laws of other countries.
420
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments — Result of the Uruguay Round, Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
421
See NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 18.06 (“TRIPs cannot serve as the basis for releasing
Members from their antecedent treaty obligations.”).
422
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 355-56 (1999).
416
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The laws of France, Germany, and most nations of the world are
predicated on the notion that copyright law serves to protect the
interests of the individual author and these laws hold moral rights
to be the most important interests an author has. Moral rights will
always remain fundamentally important. Any attempt to diminish
their importance will be met with resistance by European Union
member states and many others. And overreaching attempts to
extinguish the impact of moral rights will be met with anger and
bitterness.
Finally, it is in public interest of the United States to protect
authors’ rights of attribution and integrity on a global scale. Such
protection will guarantee authors the international recognition and
respect they deserve as well as increase their marketability.
Unreasonable designations or uses of their works will only harm
authors’ success and their incentive to create.
In addition, the United States should even consider expanding
the scope of moral rights by lobbying for a right to prevent
unauthorized use of an author’s means of expression — face,
voice, gestures — subject to fair use and other exceptions. An
inclusion of such a right in Berne or TRIPs would protect globally
against computer-generated theft of an author’s image and
expression.423
X. CONCLUSION
The challenges of the future can only be met by eliminating the
conflicts of the past. It is in the best interest of the American
public and American authors to implement moral rights. As the
world’s largest producer of works of authorship, the United States
has a powerful national interest in providing the greatest degree of
international protection possible for these works.424 No one stands
to gain as much from a strong international recognition of authors’
rights as American authors.425 Moral rights are the last remaining
423

See supra note 406. Such rights are protected in American law by unfair
competition, privacy, and perhaps under the copyright act. Assessing such rights in
foreign jurisdictions will be a cumbersome task and the likelihood of success will be
difficult to gauge. Having a clear international rule of law on the issue would simplify
enforcement.
424
See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 22.
425
Individual and corporate American authors will depend increasingly on the level of
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barrier to international consensus on the most basic rights of
authors. The official recognition of moral rights would be a small
but highly significant step towards reaching international closure
on the basic principles and rights that copyright law entails and in
achieving the “highest available level of international copyright
protection” for American authors.426
The conflict over moral rights results from misperception and
misunderstanding. Moral rights are not an amorphous bundle of
rights that allow an over-sensitive author to interfere with the
profitable public use of his work. They are a specific set of rights
that protect fundamental interests of an author in relation to his
work.
American law recognizes these interests and their
importance for the author’s creative drive. The Copyright Act
already incorporates the right to publish and the right to retract. As
well, many of the protections for attribution and integrity in
American law already achieve results similar to the level of
protection in France and Germany.427
The United States and Europe are tantalizingly close to reaching
full agreement on the basic rights of an author. Both systems are
based on the author’s fundamental right to control his work and its
uses. Both systems recognize the interests of the public and
publishers in the use of a work and balance the interests of all three
groups to achieve effective regulation. And both systems limit
moral rights in the public interest but require a reasonable use of an
author’s work to protect the work from unfair uses.
No compelling reason exists to continue the controversy over
moral rights and to resist a greater consensus between the
European and American copyright systems. Moral rights and the
public interest do not stand in opposition to one another: the
fundamental interests of authors and the public good are in
complete harmony.428

international protection to assure they receive adequate compensation and respect for
their works.
426
Hatch, supra note 22, at 171 (quoting Remarks of President Ronald Reagan on
Signing the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1405 (Oct. 31, 1988)).
427
French and German law go beyond the minimum requirements of Berne, but the
United States can limit its protection to the standards imposed by Berne.
428
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“The public good fully
coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.”).

